France: The vote on gay marriage
Gabriel Girard
Originally published in International Viewpoint
April 2013
On 23
April the second vote in the National Assembly passed this proposal into law.
The radicalisation of the opponents to “Marriage for all” had continued apace
since the article below was written. Demonstrations saw the “parliamentary
right” alongside leading members of the far-right National Front, although not
Marine Le Pen herself. Homophobia became frighteningly visible, including in
attacks on people leaving gay bars in a number of cities. The demonstrations by
partisans of the draft law, although supported by the Socialist Party and the
other parties to its left (Front de Gauche including the Parti de Gauche and
Communist Party, the NPA...), did not mobilise as broadly. This is no doubt due
to the general disillusion with the Socialist Party government. International
Viewpoint will publish more in the future on the polarisation around this
question. [International Viewpoint]
On
Tuesday 12 February, a little before 5pm, the French National Assembly voted by
a large majority for the so-called “marriage for all” law, which gives same sex
couples the right to civil marriage and to adopt children. Although this is a
first reading, with the law yet having to be examined and voted on by the
Senate, there is no doubt that the text will be definitively adopted before the
summer, since the left holds the majority in both chambers.
This vote
comes after several months of intense debates within French society between
supports and opponents of equal rights. The satisfaction of an old demand of
the LGBT movement is an undeniable success. However, the formal equality thus
acquired does not end the fight against homophobia and transphobia. The
adoption of the law, an indispensable stage on the road to equality, could
however accentuate the process of differentiation developing among gays and
lesbians. For the better off, a homosexual lifestyle is becoming increasingly
one option among others. A banalisation barely detectable in the more
precarious fringes of the community (youth, transgender, women, ethnic
minorities, the HIV positive and so on), while the economic crisis strengthens
dependency on the family, undermining the material conditions of emancipation.
Awkwardly, some critical actors in “homo-nationalism” have in recent weeks
wished to stress the existence of these fractures, in particular in the popular
neighbourhoods and among young people of immigrant origin. [1]
Some dangerous positions which have revived controversies on racism and
imperialism in the LGBT communities, which run through the movement at an international
level. Not a very good climate for a constructive debate on these issues.
Developing
an approach of critical emancipation of hetero-normality, which is however
attentive to the rhythms of mobilisation and politicisation of the majority of
LGBT persons is the challenge for radical activists and the left of the LGBT
movement.
The context
Contained
in the manifesto of the candidate of the Parti Socialiste, François Hollande,
during the presidential campaign of 2012, the demand for the right to same sex
marriage has been raised for 15 years by the French LGBT movements.
In 1999,
the left government had established the PaCS, a contract of civil union
offering a legal framework to same sex couples, but without granting them all
the associated rights of marriage. At the time, this first advance, however
timid, had raised heated debates on the left, some fearing that the recognition
of same sex unions threatened the “symbolic order” of the family. As an
illustration of this, the adoption of the PaCS had been delayed for several
months by the weak mobilisation of left deputies, who were in the minority in
the Assembly during the first vote on the text. For the LGBT movements, the
PaCS was a protective gain notably for couples including an HIV positive partner.
But it was immediately challenged as a discriminatory law, because it
established a legal inequality between homosexuals and heterosexuals.
From 2000
onwards, in a context where the right was in power, equality of rights rapidly
became the main demand of the LGBT movements. In 2004, as Spain legalised the
right to same sex marriage, a Green deputy, N. Mamère, participated in a
marriage between two men, taking advantage of a loophole in the law: the sex of
the married couple was not specified in the Civil Code. This symbolic action of
disobedience had a high media profile, but remained isolated, with no other
elected representative following. In subsequent years, the demand for marriage
remained a priority on the agenda of LGBT struggles. But the perception that a
victory would not be possible while the right was in power led most
organisations to await a left electoral victory. Hence, while equality remained
the main theme of Gay Pride Marches, no significant political campaign was
waged on the subject.
The
weakening of a perspective in terms of construction of a relationship of forces
on these issues explains to a great extent the relative disorganisation of
activist groups at the time where the right and Catholic Church entered the
debate in September 2012.
The forces on the ground
During
the debate on the PaCS in the late 1990s, the right and its fringes close to
the Catholic Church had already led a heated opposition to the project,
organising a demonstration of nearly 100,000 persons in Paris. The emblem of
this anti-PaCS right, the deputy Christine Boutin, had not hesitated to
brandish the Bible in the National Assembly to support her arguments. In a
general manner, debate gave way to a deluge of homophobia. Meanwhile the left
and the LGBT movements remained barely audible, and the Socialist Party was
divided on the subject.
In 2012,
the context was very different. The Socialists had just won the elections; the
right was defeated, weakened by an internal leadership race and electorally
rivalled by the Front National. The UMP leaders thus sought subjects to oppose
the left, since the austerity policies pursued by Hollande left it with little
room to differentiate itself. The draft law on “marriage for all” gave it an
opportunity. In contrast to the debate on the PaCS, opponents advanced an
apparently more “subtle” approach.
Openly
homophobic discourse was abandoned, at least publicly, and the arguments
centred above all on issues of parenting (adoption, medically assisted
procreation, surrogate parenting). The figureheads of the “anti-equality”
movement – two gays against marriage and a second rate singer/humorist – sought
to offer a less political face to this combat. The critique of the “right to
the child” and the defence of family values provided the rhetorical framework
for the right. However, without surprise, opposition to the draft law rested on
a highly reactionary movement very much anchored to the right and the Catholic
networks. And during the demonstrations, homophobic slogans dominated. Two big
demonstrations were organised, on November 17, 2012 and January 13, 2013, which
attracted hundreds of thousands of people, supported by the UMP and the Front
National, as well as the main representatives of Catholicism and other
monotheistic religions. The Catholic Church put all its strength into the
battle, massively organising the transport of demonstrators to Paris.
Occupying
the media terrain, the anti equality forces adopted an essentialist and sexist
discourse on gender and the heterosexual family order. They succeeded in
polarising the debate around parenting and mobilised deputies opposed to the
draft. The confusion reached its target, when Hollande wobbled, evoking a
“conscience clause” for mayors hostile to the law. This, coupled with the
massive demonstration of November 17, had the effect of an electric shock for
LGBT activists and their supports. All the more in that the discourse of the
right gave new life to everyday homophobia. On December 16, at the call of
associations, trade unions and left political parties, nearly 150,000 people
demonstrated throughout France in support of equal rights. The political left
as a whole (NPA, Front de Gauche, Socialist Party, Greens) gave its support to
the draft law. This demonstration, followed by a new, still bigger, march on
January 27, was an unexpected event. They marked the most significant
mobilisation for the LGBT movement in the past 40 years, apart from the Gay
Pride Marches (which in recent years have attracted nearly 500,000 people in
Paris).
However
the government continued to send contradictory signals. While stating its
determination, it retreated on the issues of parenting, explaining that access
to assisted fertilisation for female couples would not be part of the draft
law. Meanwhile Hollande personally received the organisers of the anti-marriage
demonstrations, and the government unambiguously denounced surrogacy. The law
voted for on February 12 satisfied some of the major demands of the LGBT
movement but remained short of hopes.
Even if
it is still too soon to draw the balance sheet, the mobilisation in favour of
equal rights in autumn and winter constituted an important vector of
politicisation in the LGBT communities. During these demonstrations, poles of
radicalism appeared: the Pink block, articulating anti-capitalism, anti-racism
and the fight against hetro normality; or the collective “Oui, oui, oui”,
notably around the Panthères Roses, defending a clear demand for equality faced
with the hesitations of the socialist government. More broadly, hundreds of
thousands of gays and lesbians have gone onto the street, taken part in social
networks, in their places of study or work, expressing the force of a daily
resistance to the homophobic discourse of the right.
The strategic issues for the LGBT movement
The
limits to this mobilisation should be noted however. Strategically, it has at
first rapidly appeared indispensable to agree on unifying demands. But with the
pro equality movement being established above all in reaction to the right wing
mobilisation, and according to the legislative calendar, demobilisation could
be strong once the law is definitively adopted. The institutional bodies of the
movement (the inter-LGBT in particular) bear a great share of the
responsibility for this. At a time when the recrudescence of homophobic
discourse and acts observed during recent months has cruelly underlined the
need to continue a basic struggle on this terrain.
On the
“content” of equality, the recent mobilisation has not allowed deeper debates
to emerge. Hence, the feminist critiques of the institution of marriage or the
necessary debates on surrogacy have been inaudible. For the left activists of
the LGBT movement, a “progressive” strategy has been imposed: to win first on
marriage and adoption so as then to push forward debates on family and conjugal
norms. However, in the absence of democratic structuring, the potential
political space for these debates could be significantly reduced in the coming
weeks.
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