Showing posts with label Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Show all posts

Thursday, June 27, 2024

France: New Poplur Front challenges the far-right




Lisbeth Latham

In the wake of the far-right National Rally (RN) winning the largest share of votes in France for the European Elections on June 9. French President Emmanuel Macron announced the dissolution of the French General Assembly with new elections to be held on June 30, with run-off elections to be held on July 7. The announcements have sparked real fears that RN could form a government. However, in the face of this threat, France’s left and progressive forces are seeking to fight back both on the street and through the formation of a New Popular Front (NFP). This development has generated both hopes for the left and fears for business that the snap elections could usher in a united left government.

In the European Parliament elections, like far-right parties across Europe but most notably in Germany and Austria, the RN’s vote surged to 31.37% or 7.76 million votes. This result was a substantially improved performance in comparison with RN’s performance in the 2022 National Assembly elections (18.7%) and the Front National (RN’s name at the time) in the 2019 European elections (23.3%). The substantial growth in RN’s vote, along with the fall in votes of parties that support President Macron which collapsed from 22.42% (2019) to 14.52% (2024). Raising fears that RN would be in a strong position to win both the 2024 presidential and national assembly elections.

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Map showing the political alignment with the highest vote in different localities across France on June 9 - Brown being Far-Right


In response to the poor performance of his supporters in the June 9 elections, Macron announced the dissolution of the National Assembly with the first round of new elections to be held on June 30. In announcing the dissolution, Macron said “France needs a clear majority in serenity and harmony”, a reference to the difficulty that Macron has faced with his supporters not winning a clear majority in the National Assembly in the 2022 election

Given the very different momentums between the far-right and the parties of the centre. RN and its leader Jordan Bardella are seen as being in a strong position to win a majority and form government. Indeed, Bardella has repeatedly said that the RN would only form government in its own right rather than build coalitions with other parties post the elections.

This possibility has led to significant speculation as to Macron’s motivation in taking a risk in allowing RN to form a government. One is to place pressure on the traditional Gaullist right-wing parties, most notably the Republicans, to enter into a coalition with Macron’s Rennaisance to form a government to avoid the threat of RN, or that should RN form a government that it would be in a situation of cohabitation with Macron’s presidency, which would limit the ability of an RN government to implement its agenda, and Macron potentially still able to push through legislation without reference to the national assembly via cl 49.3 of the French constitution which allows the president to declare legislation passed unless there is a vote of no confidence in the national assembly. This would require RN not only to have the largest bloc but a viable majority in the Assembly. Supporters of Macron’s approach hope that this frustration of RN’s agenda would result in dissatisfaction amongst their voters, positioning Macron and his supporters to then win the 2027 elections.

While this approach has been seen as a potentially risky but brilliant gamble the real potential risks are not going to be felt by Macron, but by the broader French population, particularly the working and popular classes and France’s marginalised communities who have historically been the target of RN’s agenda. This reality reflects the deeply cynical character of the decision to dissolve the National Assembly.

In the wake of the dissolution of the National Assembly, Éric Ciotti, the head of the Republicans has made it clear that he is willing to consider entering a coalition with not just RN, but also France’s second far-right party Reconquest which received 5.46% of the vote. This announcement resulted in an outcry within the Republicans and a move by the party’s leadership on June 12 to expel Ciotti from the Party - a move that the Paris Judicial Court overturned on June 15. On June 17, Ciotti announced that he would lead a list of 62 candidates from The Republicans in alliance with RN.

Despite Ciotti’s actions the leadership of Reconquest has refused to enter the alliance. Marion Maréchal, who was elected to the European Parliament for the party, and the niece of FN Presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, and the granddaughter of the National Front founder and long-time leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, led the negotiations with RN on behalf of Reconquest. However, when these broke down, she criticised party leader Éric Zemmourare accusing im of making too many demands, and announcing she would support the joint list between RN and Ciotti. In response Maréchal was expelled from Reconquest on June 13. Reconquest is standing their own list of candidates, but perfomance in opinion polls has collapsed to between 1-2%.

In the face of the European Election results and the dissolving of the National Assembly, there have been two linked responses from France’s left parties and broader social movements. The call for a united electoral alliance to attempt to achieve the best possible electoral outcome for the left and in parallel calls for popular mobilisations against both the dissolution of the National Assembly and the threat from the far-right.

On June 10, a call was issued for the formation of NFP to “carry a program of social and ecological ruptures to build an alternative to Emmanuel Macron and combat the racist project of the far right”. There were 11 initial signatory organisations including Rebellious France (FI), the Socialist Party (PS), the Ecologists, and the French Communist Party (PCF). While individual leaders of the PS initially rebuffed the call, this reluctance had changed by June 14, with Raphaël Glucksmann, the leader of the PS’s European Parliamentary elections ticket announcing his support. A contributing factor to this decision would have been the announcement by former president François Hollande, who had historically been close to Macron and had endorsed Macron’s previous presidential election campaigns, that he was supporting the NFP. Hollande has been confirmed as the candidate for the constituency he represented for 22 years prior to his election to the presidency in 2012.

The FNP’s agreed platform for the election includes:
  • the abolition of Article 49.3 of the French Constitution;
  • the introduction of proportional representation for elections to the National Assembly;
  • organising a constituent assembly to prepare a new constitution for France, moving from the current Fifth Republic to the new Sixth Republic;
  • supporting a retirement age of 60 and the repeal of the 2023 French pension reform law;
  • introducing paid menstruation leave;
  •  a 14% increase in the minimum wage;
  • re-introduction of the solidarity tax on wealth that had been abolished in 2017;
  • introducing a new tax on excess profits;
  • increasing the Generalised Social Contribution paid by the richest taxpayers;
  • free school lunches and supplies;
  • abolition the Parcoursup University Admissions system - which limits the number of university places for high school leavers;
  • supporting military aid to Ukraine, while committing to no direct French military intervention;
  • recognising the State of Palestine;
  • enforcing an arms embargo against Israel;
  • introducing gender self-identification for trans people;
  • abolition of universal national service
The announcement of the formation of the NFP has given significant hope to the French electorate with the NFP receiving between 26-29% support in national polls. This is close to maintaining the combined results that the NFP’s constituent parts received in the European Election of 31.58%. This consolidation of support makes it much more likely that candidates of the NFP will either be directly elected or reach the second round (when no candidate in the constituency achieves a majority of the vote. Support in polls remains consistently below the results for the RN’s polling of between 29.5-36%. The support for the NFP has given rise to concerned speculation in France’s mainstream media regarding the prospect of a NFP government, particularly one in which the FI’s leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would be prime-minister. With open speculation as to the willingness of French capital to support a RN government. Hoping to curry this support RN has announced that it would back away from promises to lower France’s taxes on fuel, power, and the broader value added tax.

The urgency of the situation has seen the far-left New Anti-Capitalist Party-Anti-Capitalist (the NPA split in 2023, the other component is the NPA-Revolutionary) announce that it would participate in the NFP. Whilst the NPA-Anti-Capitalist is small, in several constituencies, particularly around Bourdeux, where it has local councillors, it could have played a role in diffusing the left vote. The NPA-Anti-Capitalist’s participation in the NFP is significant as it and its precursors have, whilst willing to participate in negotiations around the formation of united electoral efforts, stood apart from left-electoral fronts to a large extent since 2002. This refusal has been primarily based on a desire for the formations to adopt a clear position going into elections that it would reject a governmental alliance with the PS due to the PS’s record of social liberalism in government, that is neoliberalism with a social democratic face. In announcing their participation in the NFP, the NPA - Anti-Capitalist observed “in a few days, all the left-wing political forces, unions, associations and movements working on environmental, anti-racist, feminist and LGBT+ struggles, grouped around the New Popular Front. In a few days, it is indeed our social camp, that of the exploited and oppressed, which has reconstituted itself as a political subject to defend its rights”.

The NPA-Anti-Capitalist is not alone in adding to the supporters of the NFP. There are now some 53 parties, five union confederations, and numerous social movement organistations that have joined and supporting the front.



Since June 16 there have regular protests across France called by FNP and other left and progressive social and political forces. Whilst not at the level of mass mobilisation as has been seen in France’s past they are significant. The interior ministry estimated national participation in protests across France on June 16 at 250, 000, whilst the General Confederation of Labour put participation at 640, 000 with estimates of Paris protest participation being 72, 000 and 250, 000 respectively. The details of the 117 actions against the RN across France this week can be found here.

Irrespective of the outcome of the first and second rounds of the elections. The capacity and willingness of France’s left and popular movements to build on these mobilisations play a central role. In the lead-up to the second round of elections, this will include pressuring the parties of the centre and right to work against the election RN candidates. In the wake of the second round opposing any efforts to build a coalition with RN to form government. Finally in the face of whatever government is formed to struggle for the interests of working and popular classes and marginalised communities whether against a government of the far-right, centre, or in holding the parties of the left to the NFP program.

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Friday, October 6, 2017

France: Movement builds against anti-worker measures

Lisbeth Latham

France’s Council of Ministers approved five ordinances on September 22 that undermine union power and employment rights within France’s Labour Code, which came into effect the next day.

The government imposed these changes by using undemocratic measures in France’s constitution, which allows it to push new measures into law without passing legislation through parliament.

In the face of this, the movement against the changes continues to build. 

France Insoumise (France Unbowed, FI) held a national convergence in Paris on September 23 against what it described as a “social coup”. The protest mobilised 150,000 people — more than twice the size of the largest Paris mobilisation so far against these attacks.

FI leader Jean-Luc Melenchon told the crowd: “We were not able to discuss a single line, a single page, of the ordinances!”

The Washington Post reported that Melenchon said “we must bring forward the strength of our people in battle and in the streets”.

On September 26 the transport federations of the General Confederation of Workers (CGT), Workers’ Force (FO) and National Union of Autonomous Unions (UNSA) began sustained strike action against the changes, including blockades of oil depots and major highways. As a result, there have been widespread petrol shortages at service stations.

On September 28, there were mobilisations across France by retired workers and students. These protests targeted the changes to the labour code, but also the broader assault by President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Edouard Phillipe on social conditions.

In particular, protesters targeted the 1.7% rise in the Generalised Social Contribution (CSG) and the failure of thousands of students to receive selection advice for entry into university. The CSG contributes to the funding of France’s social security system and is paid by both workers and retirees.
Macron and France’s peak employer organisation, MEDEF, hoped that worker and union resistance would dissipate with the ordinances coming into effect. Macron has downplayed the significance of the movement, telling CNN: “I believe in democracy” and that “democracy is not in the street”.

Instead, the resistance continues to grow.

Unions have called for a joint public and private sector strike on October 10. This will be the first joint strike by France’s public sector unions in 10 years.

Unfortunately, the unity between unions within the public sector has not been replicated in the private sector. An October 3 mass meeting of 10,000 officials and activists of the conservative French Confederation of Democratic Workers (CFDT), the largest confederation in the private sector, refused to endorse strike action on October 10.

However, there was opposition to this conservative approach expressed at the October 3 meeting, which could result in more CFDT members joining the October 10 protests than occurred with the previous France-wide protests against the attacks on September 12 and 21.
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[This article was originally published in Green Left Weekly #1156]

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Sunday, June 11, 2017

France: France Insoumise, the PCF and the challenge of building a left fight-back against Macron

Lisbeth Latham
The strong performance of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of the French presidential election (19.58%), the highest vote by candidate to the left of social democracy since 1969, gave rise to hope for the potential for the French left to rebuild its presence in the French parliament and establish itself as a barrier to Macron establishing a parliamentary majority. A factor that could contribute to fully realising this opportunity would be the extent to which a united-left electoral campaign could be built– particularly between the parties which made up the Front de Gauche (Left Front - FG).

Jean-Luc Mélenchon addresses a France Insoumise rally
However, rather than unity the dynamics of division that have been in play for more than two years have largely deepened and could potentially result in the left returning fewer members to parliament than in 2012.

Mélenchon’s presidential campaign was primarily driven by France Insoumise (Indomitable France – FI), the mass organisation which Mélenchon launched on February 10, 2016 with the support of Parti de Gauche (Left Party – PG), the party he launched following his resignation from the PS in 2009. When FI was launched, Mélenchon also announced the dissolution of the Front de Gauche – the electoral front which had been launched between the PG, the Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party – PCF) and a number of smaller left parties. FI has primarily organised via the web, with supporters being organised into committees of between 5-12 people, By May 1, FI had more than 450, 000 supporters, in March, when the organisation had over 260, 000 supporters, there were 2, 800 committees across.

Pierre Laurent
In addition to the support from FI, Mélenchon’s presidential campaign was supported by the PCF and Ensemble (a regroupment of smaller left groups within the FG). However, while the launch of FI and Mélenchon’s presidential campaign was supported by some of PCF’s leadership, particularly Pierre Laurent, PCF National Secretary, and Marie-George Buffet, current MP and former PCF National Secretary, many PCF members were hostile to both the creation of FI and to Melenchon’s presidential campaign. Fifty-five percent of the PCF’s National Conference on November 5, rejected a proposal to support Melenchon’s presidential bid. Three weeks later, 54% of the party’s 50, 000 paid membership voted to support Mélenchon’s candidacy. This support was vital, as in order to be formally nominated for president, he required the endorsement from 500 elected officials – which the PCF’s formal support gave him. There was also significant resistance within Ensemble where 30% of members voting against supporting Mélenchon’s candidature.

Mélenchon’s success in the presidential elections while being a culmination of a growth of in hope around his campaign – also raised the hope that if the vote could be translated through to the legislative elections there would be a possibility that the left of the PS could not only significantly boost its presence in parliament, but have a big enough contingent to be able to block Emmanuel Macron’s La Republique En Marche! (the Republic on the Move – LREM) holding a majority in the parliament. This need was reinforced after Macron announced his government with former right-wing Les Repulicains MP Édouard Philippe as his prime minister. Macron announced plans for a new round of attacks on workers to follow on from last year’s El Khomri labour laws which significantly undermined worker and union rights.

Despite this hope and need for a united left electoral response, it has not materialised. While in the wake of the Macron’s victory in the second round both the PCF and Ensemble! issued statements calling for a united left electoral ticket. FI insisted the basis for unity was for candidates run under FI’s banner, be based on acceptance of FI’s program, and that all public funding generated based on votes for FI candidates would go to FI. Positions which the PCF was unwilling to accept, based on their desire run under a common banner but also allow individual parties to be profiled and the PCF’s unwillingness to campaign for the withdrawal from nuclear power generation. On May 9, Manuel Bompard an FI spokesperson announced that negotiations had broken down, he blamed the PCF’s Laurent for this. As a consequence, the FI would be running its own candidates in every constituency including constituencies where the PCF, Ensemble!, or Europe Ecology les Vertes (Europe Ecology - The Greens) have sitting MPs (unless the sitting MP had endorsed Mélenchon’s presidential campaign).



The failure to form a united ticket reflects long-running tensions within the FG which culminated in the 2015 regional elections where the FG was heavily divided and received tiny votes. From the outset there were tensions within the Front about both the character of the front, was it an alliance between organisations or should individual activists be able to join and have a say, and around democracy, with the PCF, particularly in areas where it was the largest organisation, imposing its candidates, there had also been tensions as to who could say they were front candidate – which was a problem in municipal and regional elections where tickets are run and at times member organisations were represented on different tickets – with the sharpest question being could a ticket involving official PS candidates be labelled a FG ticket? With the PCF (which was more likely to be in such an alliance pushing for the ability for it to wave the FG flag in these circumstances).

These tensions culminated in a meeting of the European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (EUG/NGL) in 2014 where PG sort to block Pierre Laurent’s election to the presidency of the EUL/NGL over the question of the PCF’s running joint tickets with the PS, although Laurent was subsequently elected. In the 2015 regional elections (which were marked by a sharp increase in support for the Front National) the FG ran only a seven of tickets involving all of the FG– with the rest being a variety of separate tickets with the PCF and thePG running on different tickets. The joint tickets performed badly, with the only ticket in Languedoc-Roussillon-Midi-Pyrénées receiving sufficient votes to contest the second round – all the remaining tickets averaging 2.49%. In the wake of this failure, the Front essentially stopped operating as a joint organisation and Mélenchon announcing the PG would be leaving the Front.

The rupture between the PCF and FI has created considerable concern that it will dramatically undermine the ability to of the left to maximise its parliamentary representation and build an effective block to work with social movements to oppose Macron’s regressive agenda for France. On May 10, Ensemble! issued a statement saying that it was not the time to settle scores or for mutual accusations, but instead to build a framework for bringing together the forces which had supported Mélenchon’s candidacy, based on a proposal of a common charter for candidates for the legislative elections that Ensemble! had made to the PCF and FI – Ensemble! had also called for regional and departmental meetings of the organisations to try and overcome the “national bottleneck”. While these proposals if adopted might create clarity for the basis of joint candidates, it doesn’t overcome the sticking point of who would be the candidate in each constituency – particularly when the PCF is faced with a fight for its electoral survival, and there is a view that Mélenchon’s approach to the PCF is partly motivated by desire to further marginalise the PCF.

It is unclear what the impact of the electoral division will have on the elections. The shared polling for the FI/PCF has been in decline since early May from a high of 18% to a low of 14.5% with projected returned candidates down from a projected high of 25-30 to a low of 12-22 (the FG components currently hold 10 seats). The splitting of the vote is likely to result in less candidates making it through to the second round (unlike the presidential elections where only the top two candidates go through to the second round, in the legislative elections if no candidate gets more than 50% of the vote then all candidates receiving more than 12% of the vote qualify for the second round) other than lowering confidence of the left electorate, having two or more left candidates (both the Nouveau Parti Anticapitlisate and Lutte Ouvrier will also be standing candidates) in a constituency may not undermine the capacity for the left to win seats. The bigger threats are the potential rebound in the PS vote from the historic low of 6.38% which Hamon received in April – while the left division could contribute to this – the PS performs is likely to be better at the local level particularly from the PS’s left who opposed the regressive record of the Hollande and the governments of Aryault and Valls. An additional factor is that Hamon’s vote also collapsed as Mélenchon’s campaign built momentum and it looked more likely he could overtake Francois Fillon and possibly Le Pen – this dynamic is much less likely to occur in the legislative elections, at least at the national level. By far the biggest threat to the return of left candidates, however, will be the threat of abstentionism as people see a victory for Macron’s LREM and the forces to its right as inevitable.

The reality is that no matter the result for the parties of the left – they will not be able to block Macron’s agenda by their actions in parliament alone – even if LREM does not achieve an electoral majority outright, it will be in a position to try and stick together sufficient support from the PS and Les Repulicains to pass legislation. The only force which will be able to stop that process will be the resistance in the streets. To this end, there has been a positive boost to the resistance with the formation of the Social Front. Initiated by union activists who had been involved in the campaign against the El Khomri laws and who had been frustrated by the decision by union leaderships to end mobilisations against those laws on September 15, 2016. The FS called for mobilisations against both Le Pen and Macron on April 22, May 1, and May 8 – it has now expanded its support to from 70 militant organisations. The FS has also called for a national meeting on June 10, along with local organising meetings after that date, and a mass mobilisation for June 19. The significance of the emergence of the FS is that in the last decade resistance to government attacks, particularly on workers, has primarily occurred via the intersydicale which brings together the leaderships of France’s union confederations – however if some of these confederations refuse to participate such as the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labour) and the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers) in the campaign against the El Khomri laws in 2016, then there is a very limited framework for engaging rank-and-file members of these confederations who want to fight government attacks. The formation of the FS may provide a framework to reach out to broader layers of workers and build resistance despite the direction of the more conservative confederation leaderships.


While there are serious challenges for progressive forces in France – made more difficult by the organisational divisions within the left, both the legislative elections and the formation of the FS pose a positive opportunity to build resistance to the attacks which Macron is preparing on French society. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

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Tuesday, April 29, 2014

France: Notes on the French situation after the local elections and the 12th April demonstration

François Sabado
21 April 2014
from International Viewpoint

1) The last municipal elections represent a new worsening of the political balance of forces for the left and the labour movement. 150 cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants swung from SP or CP-led to the right or far right.

Of course, after years of social-liberalism where the PS took its distance from the labour movement, a defeat of the PS at the polls no longer automatically indicates a defeat of the workers’ movement.

These workers, who do not feel represented by the parliamentary left any more, do not feel the bankruptcy of the Socialists to be theirs, fortunately. They even abstained massively (between 50 and 60 % of the registered voters in the popular suburbs or regions).

2) But when such defeat at the polls of PS leaves the space to the right and far right, when what remains of “historical municipal socialism” is falling apart, when the PCF loses a third of its local councils, in particular in the “red suburbs”, and these retreats are not compensated for, far from it, by victories of the radical left, this can only weigh negatively on the power relations between the classes.

This took place in an economic context marked by plant closures and governmental attacks which can provoke struggles or partial mobilizations, but that are not strong enough to block the austerity policies or to force the government to retreat. Years of reorganization of the workforce force, casualization and unemployment have shaped a workforce that is now paralysed by the crisis.

Especially as here too, the trade-union leaderships directly support the government’s“ pacts” with the employers or position themselves as “accompanying” them.

3) The last demonstration of this turn to the right was the nomination of Manuel Valls as Prime Minister.

In the SP primary elections that decided on the candidate for the 2011 presidential election, Valls represented the right within a Socialist Party that is already itself well to the right. He stood as a candidate against the 35-hour week, against an economic redistribution policy, for the privatization of the public services, and for reduction of the social security contributions, which aimed at new attacks on the Social security system. He identified loud and clear with the “policy of offer” based on a reduction of labour costs and subsidies for businesses – opposed to a policy of restarting the economy by demand. He got only 5% of the votes in this election, which proved that even for a very rightwing PS Valls was too much.

Two years, later, Valls’ policy is being openly applied, by Hollande, by the government and the PS. Stark result: 30 billion of subsidies to business, 50 billion of budgetary “savings” which will result in severe cuts in the public budget and social security. Already announced: the closure of ten hospitals, non-refunding of certain prescriptions, fall in wages of state employees. In Europe that is in a deep and lsting crisis, and where growth rate is around 1 %, such a policy can only plunge the country into the infernal spiral of austerity, unemployment and precarity.

But isn’t this precisely the desired goal, a radical modification of the social and political balance of forces? To undermine what remains of the “European social model” by eliminating a series of social gains, and align Europe in world competition.

4) The problem is that these socio-economic choices sap the social bases of the traditional parties, both of the right and left, and provoke political crises.

As regards social democracy, these parties are “less and less working-class and increasingly middle-class”. They are not bourgeois parties like the others, because the system needs their specificity to ensure alternation. But the relationships of these parties to the labour movement no longer express their history and their politics no longer have much to do with the classical policies of social democracy. They are neoliberal policies. For ordinary citizens and salaried workers Hollande-Valls are on the same line continuity as Sarkozy not only on social and economic qustions, but also in pressions repression o the undocumented or communities like the Romani. Valls is not offended by being considered the Sarkozy of the left.

But will the neo-liberal evolution of the PS not put into question the very existence of these parties? In southern Europe, the Portuguese PS or the Spanish PSOE have not shared the historical catastrophe of the Greek PASOK, even if they have been weakened. The French PS is still a major party, but these elections shook one of its fundamental pillars: its in the bases… If it continues its policy, other electoral failures will follow: with forthcoming European election, in the regional elections and cantonal and one does not see how the PS could claw back its support before the next presidential and parliamentary elections in 2017. A total collapse cannot be excluded.

The drop in support for the PCF is of another nature, that of the historical decline of post-Stalinism, but it represents also this worsening of the balance of power, in particular in a series of cities where the right has replaced the PCF elected representatives in the councils.

5) It is in this situation, with record abstention, that there was the swing to the right and the Front National, the latter gaining control of about ten big cities. The right has been strengthened in spite of contradictions on a series of questions: Europe, relations with the Front National, its leadership given the possible “comeback” of Sarkozy. Its activist base and its electors are under pressure from the ultra rightwing or the far right. As for the FN, it has confirmed its popular base, and the fact is that it increasingly attracts part of the working and popular electorate. Like the parties of fascist origin, it combines social questions and racism in its programme, but how i, in this situation will it manage contradictions between its fascist origin and leadership and the pressures that will arise from its integration in the institutions?

Admittedly, we are not in the 1930s, the ruling classes have chosen integration in capitalist globalization and not protectionist nationalism, but there can be “political accidents”, swing moments, where there would be a desynchronization between the fundamental socio-economic choices of the capitalist classes and the irruption of authoritative political solutions with the coming to power of (direct or indirect) coalitions of the right and the far right. The growth of the far right throughout Europe and the acceptance of governments like that of Orban in Hungary show the possible dangers for democratic freedoms and the popular movement.

In France as in many Europe, the balance is tipping towards the right, but fortunately there is also a social and political fightback.

6) The day of demonstrations on Saturday 12 April 12 in Paris and throughout the country testifies to this resistance. Several tens of thousands of demonstrators answered the call of more than 200 leaders of campaigns, trade unions or political parties to fight against the right and the far right and to oppose the austerity plans of the Hollande-Valls government.

The origin was a call by Olivier Besancenot for a weekend of revolt by the left against the successive demonstrations of the extremist right and the governmental policy. This was followed by statements along the same lines from Front de Gauche leaders. Then there were several weeks of work on a united-front call and preparatory meetings. The nomination of Valls gave an additional impetus to this mobilization. What made the success of this demonstration was its unity, its radical nature and its diversity. As well as the political organizations, tens of campaigns in particular for the right to housing, and sectors of the trade union movement were mobilized. In the CGT, a significant number of federations and local sections called for the mobilization against the position of the confederal direction. We should also note the significant contingents of PCF and the NPA in the Parisian march. This demonstration showed that, despite of the results of the municipal elections, there is a leftwing in France that does not accept the government’s policy and resists, and goes well beyond simply the parties of the radical left.

7) One of the key questions is: how to continue, how to express politically this dynamic of partial but significant mobilization, in this context of downturn?

The questions of unity of action, of radicality, and the fight against the governmental policy, the right and the far right are a guiding line for anticapitalists.

First in day-to-day social resistance, the fights against redundancies, budget cuts, strikes or mobilizations for social rights. The demonstrations for 1st of May are the next occasion. Without broad social mobilization which blocks austerity plans, wrests some partial victories, makes it possible to give back confidence to the workers and social movements, there will not be the beginning of change of the balance of forces. It is decisive.

But this must also be expressed politically by united action in struggles and in electoral battles. Already in the local elections, the NPA presented or supported 87 lists including 55 united ones, on an anti-austerity programme independent from the SP in the first and second round of the elections. Beyond, the radical left presented several hundreds of lists which marked a certain resistance, with appreciable results – unlike the rout of the SP.

After the municipal elections and the preparation of the 12 April demonstration the question existed of a unity proposal for the European elections. It is on this basis that the NPA sent a letter to the Front de Gauche, to LO, to Alternative Libertaire to discuss the possibility of a united list for the European elections. There are, of course, different positions on this question: the Party of the European Left is for refounding the European Union which seems to be an attempt at reform, whereas the anticapitalists fight for a break with the European institutions; Mélenchon can make ambiguous statements against “German Europe” or for “interdependent protectionism”, whereas we defend an internationalist policy without concession to nationalism. But for the “general public”, both will seem to be opposed to governmental austerity policies and the European Union and will propose another social and democratic Europe.

We this it is regrettable that the conditions could not exist to reach an agreement. The hesitations on both sides had an impact, but the tensions which paralysed Front de Gauche did not allow for a true discussion. It was, moreover, only at the last minute that the components of Front de Gauche finally reached an agreement on their own lists.

But beyond this agreement for the Europeans, the Front de Gauche is deeply divided on the relations to have with the PS. In the majority of large and medium-sized cities the PCF was allied with the PS. The other components of the Front de Gauche refused this alliance for the first round of the local elections. The result was that the Front de Gauche exploded on a key question that the NPA has raised for years: relations with the SP, then with the government. Although the NPA has been violently criticized for having put this question at the centre of the debate and has been accused of looking for excuses not to make the unity, many FdG activists recognize today that in fact the divergences on this point led to the explosion at the time of the municipal elections. Many things will depend on the next election results, in particular the Europeans, but the formula of Front de Gauche launched in 2010 is null and void today, it is necessary to discuss again unity and the basis for unity.

Indeed, unity is needed, and the anticapitalists must redouble efforts to deploy a unitive policy, but with the stepping up of the neo-liberal attacks by the PS in government, electoral alliances with this latter are impossible, support for SP parliamentary majorities or governments even more so. This is why the policy of Mélenchon to build an “ecologist popular front” with the leadership of the Greens (EELV) would lead to a new dead end, especially as the majority of the EELV group supports the Valls government.

The objective, in the weeks and the months to come, it is to broadcast loud and clear the voice of a left opposition to the government. A broad unitive opposition but a true opposition and, in this sense, we cannot build a left opposition with forces that support or take part in the government. This is unfortunately the case with the “left” of the PS and the EELV…

For the anticapitalists, in this difficult situation we have to combine unity in social and political action with a policy of clear independence from the PS, and an anticapitalist programme that defends the social needs of the workers and the population as a whole.

In a situation where the old left is rejected, it is necessary to rebuild the labour movement by redefining a unitive perspective which integrates the organizations but invents new forms and new programmiatic content. It is by fertilizing “the unity in action” with anticapitalist content that the revolutionaries will be useful in rebuilding.

The unity achieved on 12 April and suggested for the Europeans is a good indication for the orientation of the NPA in the months to come.

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François Sabado is a member of the Executive Bureau of the Fourth International and an activist in the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) in France. He was a long-time member of the National Leadership of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR).

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Tuesday, February 25, 2014

France: NPA and Left Party call for united mobilisation against government austerity and the right

Joint Statement of Nouveau parti anticapitaliste and Parti de gauche

February 17, 2014
Original in French is available here

Olivier Besancenot and Jean-Luc Mélenchon
Delegations of the Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (NPA – New Anti-capitalist Party) and the Parti de gauche (PG - Left Party) lead by Olivier Besancenot for the NPA, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Martine Billard for the PG met yesterday afternoon in the head office of the PG[1].

The two organizations signed a broad agreement. This agreement related to both the need to not leave the streets to the right, extreme-right, racists, anti-semites, sexists and homophobes of all kinds, by gathering all those on the left who reject the policy of the government. Because “enough is enough”! It is time to express the dissatisfaction of the left vis-a-vis the pro-Medef[2] policies of a government which creates the conditions of the rise of confusion and reaction to which it reverses its pledges!

The NPA and the PG observe with satisfaction that similar concerns arise in several places: call together, the idea of Pierre Laurent[3] of an initiative in April, proposals for an action of the whole of the Front de Gauche. Concretely, the two organizations agree on the need for a national march, in Paris the same day. Given the electoral calendar and demonstrations already envisaged in the calendar, including trade-union mobilization of March 18 to which the NPA and the PG call, the date April 12 seems the best. The two parties insisted on the fact that this date is a just proposal. The success of any initiative will depend indeed on the broadest possible call joining together political leaders, trade-union associations, collectives of workers in struggle (companies which are dismissing workers or threatening to close) and militant teams… It is the collective which will unite them together that will thus be responsible to embody this common will. The two organizations have agreed to work in this direction.

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1 The NPA is an anti-capitalist party initiated by the Ligue communiste revolutionaire i(LCR) in 2008, the LCR dissolved itself into the NPA prior to the NPA’s founding conference in early 2009.
The PG established in 2009 following the decision by leading parliamentarians of the Parti Sociliste’s (PS) left wing to leave the party over it’s pro-austerity policies. The PG was a founding party in the Front de gauche (FdG – Left Front) in 2009.
Olivier Besancenot was the LCR’s candidate in the French Presidential electionsin 2002 and 2007 – in which he received 4.25% and 4.08% respectively. These results which were seen as a significant breakthrough for the LCR gave impetuous to the move to initiate the NPA.
Jean-Luc- Mélenchon is a former PS senator. He left the party in 2008 to form the PG. He was elected on the FdG ticket to the European Parliament in 2009. In 2012 Mélenchon was the FdG presidential candidate, campaign, which included a series mass rallies including protests of 100, 000 people at each of the Front’s election rallies in Paris, Toulouse and Marseille – Mélenchon ultimately ran fourth in the first round receiving 11.10% of the vote. Mélenchon is co-president of both the PG and the FdG.
Martine Billard – is a FdG deputy in National Assembly of France and co-president of the PG. Billard is a former member of Les Verts (The Greens) with whom she was elected as a deputy as parted of a “united left” ticket in the 2002. She was an outspoken opponent of the European Constitution and campaign for the “no” vote in referendum on the referendum on French ratification, against the position of Les Verts.
FdG – electoral coalition initiated for the 2009 European elections. The initial adherents were the PG, the Parti communiste francais (PCF – French Communist Party) and Gauche unitaire (united left) which was a split from the NPA.

2 Refers to Francois Hollande’s call for a “responsibility pact” with MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France - Movement of the Enterprises of France), which would consist of reduction in state charges on business including taxation reform and the gradual abolition of company contributions to family allowances, in exchange for a commitment to boost employment.

3 Pierre Laurent is the national secretary of the PCF, co-president of the FdG and president of the European Left Party. Laurent has called for a march against austerity in on April 12.
Three of France’s union confederations Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour – CGT), Fédération syndicale unitaire (United Union Federation – FSU) and Solidaires have called for a united day of mobilisations and strikes for March 18 to demand urgent action on wages, employmen, social protection and public services.

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Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Front de gauche: and now?

François Sabado
May 2012
International Viewpoint

One of the striking events of the 2012 French presidential election was the campaign of the Front de Gauche (FdG) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon: tens of thousands of participants at its meetings, a significant place in the political debate and 11.01% of the vote in the first round, a notable score.

Certainly the FdG leaders had hoped for a result of more than 15% and above all third place ahead of Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen. But going from the 5% which had been predicted for them in the polls at the beginning of the campaign to 11%, they have succeed in dominating the space of the “radical left” and marginalising the revolutionary left.

A real dynamic

During this campaign a left reformist political force of mass influence has been reconstructed. This is the result of several factors:  
  • A situation, marked by social defeats, which favours the aspiration and the illusion that “what is blocked by struggle can be unblocked by the election”.  
  • The remobilisation of the forces of the Communist parties (also seen in Portugal, Spain and Greece), resting on the fact that they have not been in government for some years and that they have preserved positions in the apparatuses of the institutions or trade union organisations.  
  • A good campaign by Mélenchon. Defending radical objectives, such as a minimum wage of 1,700 euros or the defence of public services, his speeches invoked the revolutionary imagination of the texts of Victor Hugo and the most glorious moments of the workers’ movement. This alchemy unleashed a political dynamic beyond the parties of the Front de gauche. A campaign which was all the more noteworthy in that it came as a counterpoint to that of François Hollande which was especially dull (to put it mildly).

Ambiguities and contradictions

Mélenchon’s impressive campaign was however heavy with ambiguities and contradictions which justified the NPA’s independent campaign. The NPA and the FdG shared common positions on such themes as social issues (wages, employment, defence of public services) or democratic demands (proportional representation or defence of the rights of immigrants). The two organisations are united in their opposition to the FN. On the other hand, other issues divide them sharply: on nuclear energy, there is a major disagreement between the NPA and the PCF leadership, attached by numerous links to the French nuclear industry.

We share then overall common objectives, and the dynamic around the Front de gauche campaign opens new political possibilities, for their realisation. However, in terms of engaging in a serious struggle and obtaining the implementation of our demands, the PCF and Jean -Luc Mélenchon reject confrontation with the power of the capitalists. They denounce finance, not capitalist ownership. They demand a public banking sector but reject the expropriation of the banks and their nationalisation under social control, preferring to see the private and public banking sectors compete. They denounce the scandal of the debt but reject its cancellation. Mélenchon proposes a repayment of the debt over several years, balancing off the sacrifices between the capitalists and the masses. Here again, it is necessary to be consistent. If we participate in a campaign for a citizen’s audit, it is to prepare the ground for the cancellation of the debt, and not its progressive repayment. The leader of the FdG evokes “ecological planning” without indicating the strategic resources necessary to this planning, in particular, the socialisation of the key sectors of the economy, transport, and energy.

On the political and historic level, the reformist orientation of the leadership of the FdG goes hand in hand with the “republican” positions of Mélenchon. Not those of the Communards, who opposed the social republic to the bourgeois classes, but those of republicans who in their defence of the republic merge the terms “nation”, “republic” and “state”. This conception subordinates the “citizen’s revolution” or “revolution by the ballot box” to respect for the institutions of the state of the dominant classes. Mélenchon freely evokes US imperialism, but not French imperialism. During the presidential campaign he reaffirmed “that in the current situation, the nuclear deterrent remains the key element of our strategy of protection”.

Far from being questions of detail, these conceptions are key elements in Mélenchon’s politics – he will do all he can to channel, subordinate, and render compatible the mass movements and the institutions of the republic. These questions also become decisive in discussing strategy and party or political movement.

What policy towards the Front de gauche?

In relating politically to the FdG, we need to take into account these elements: the dynamic, but also the project; the mobilisation, but also the overall political programme; the renewal of activism but also the policies of the leadership.

Tens of thousands of activists and hundreds of thousands of voters have given a radical, social, democratic content to their vote or participation in the initiatives of the FdG. For them, it is about rejecting the austerity of the right but also the austerity of the left by mobilising together around vital demands like the 1,700 euros, a ban on layoffs, the defence of public services, a regular status for precarious workers in the public sector, the defence of undocumented persons. For our part, we believe it is necessary to go much further than punctual unity of action. Faced with the austerity that a Hollande government prepares for us, we offer the Front de gauche, as well as the others (LO or the alternatives) the construction of a unitary opposition to the government. The NPA is ready for it. And the FdG? This battle is decisive so as not to allow the FN to take up the banner of the opposition. It is this which must lead us to dialogue, in common action, with the activists and sympathisers of the FdG.

At the same time it should not be forgotten that the FdG is a political construction, led by the PCF and Mélenchon and not a simple united front. This is not a party, is already a political movement. That means all is not decided, questions remain open. It seems at this stage that the leaders of the FdG do not wish to participate in the government. Targeting “the taking of power, all power, within ten years”, Mélenchon rules out participation in a government that he does not lead. The constraints of the crisis are such that the PCF seem to choose a formula of "support without participation", already used in the past. Tensions could surge between the leadership of the PCF and Mélenchon. Pierre Laurent, national secretary of the PCF, sets as the objective at the parliamentary elections “the election of a left majority in the National Assembly, with the maximum of Front de gauche deputies”. A left majority with the PS? What would the FdG deputies do when the budget of the Hollande government was voted on? What the regional counsellors of the FdG have already done in nearly all regions, aligning with the PS? These questions remain open. To allow common action, an appropriate tactical policy is needed on our part.

None of the hypotheses envisaged by the FdG at this stage challenge its reformist project. Thus, at a time when calls are made to join the FdG, including from inside the NPA, we think on the contrary that the organisation of anti-capitalists cannot depend on the tactical evolution of the FdG. To join the Front de gauche is to accept the leadership of the PCF and Mélenchon. To have weight on the political scene, stimulate unitary action and keep all the possibilities of criticism demands an NPA independent of the FdG. The independent organisation of anti-capitalists is not a tactical choice. It is a strategic option which maintains the historic continuity of the revolutionary current. A dual challenge is now posed to the NPA: to resume its construction and set out a unitary policy, in particular in relation to the FdG.

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François Sabado is a member of the Executive Bureau of the Fourth International and an activist in the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) in France. He was a long-time member of the National Leadership of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR).

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Sunday, April 1, 2012

France: Thousands rally in support of Mélenchon and Front de Gauche

Lisbeth Latham

On March 18 more than 120,000 people joined in the rally for a Sixth republic called by the Front de Gauche (FdG) in support of its presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The rally was held in the Place de la Bastille and marked the 141st anniversary of the Paris Commune.



The FdG is an electoral alliance that draws together the majority of the parties to the left of the Parti Socialiste (PS), whose candidate Francois Hallande is expected to win the presidence.

Leading into the March 18 protest, Mélenchon had been polling at 11%, however in the immediate wake he polled as high as 13%. Both massive election rally and high polls demonstrates that the FdG has established significant momentum that it may be able to carry into the National Assembly elections in June and increase the Front's representation.



The Nouveau Parti Anticapaliste (NPA), which is standing it's own presidential candidate Philippe Poutou, has argued that the growing success of Mélenchon will increasingly open up contradictions both within Mélenchon position and between the organisations that make up the FdG.

Mélenchon has repeatedly called for "citizen's revolutions" which he sees as being achieved through the elections. While such a call could be seen as an aspirational hope of winning government outright, it is important to note that Mélenchon has endorsed the course pursued by Die Linke in Germany, which has entered government with the social democrats at the local level. There is also strong expectation that Parti Communiste Francais, which is by far the largest component of the FdG, and hold more than 90% of the FdG's current seats in the National Assembly, will push to enter government with the PS should it win government. When the PCF entered PS governments in the early 1980s and between 1997 and 2002, the PCF ministers participated in significant liberalisation of the French economy.



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Revitalising Labour attempts to reflect on efforts to rebuild the labour movement internationally, emphasising the role that left-wing political currents can play in this process. It welcomes contributions on union struggles, internal renewal processes within the labour movement and the struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

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