In the wake of the far-right National Rally (RN) winning the largest share of votes in France for the European Elections on June 9. French President Emmanuel Macron announced the dissolution of the French General Assembly with new elections to be held on June 30, with run-off elections to be held on July 7. The announcements have sparked real fears that RN could form a government. However, in the face of this threat, France’s left and progressive forces are seeking to fight back both on the street and through the formation of a New Popular Front (NFP). This development has generated both hopes for the left and fears for business that the snap elections could usher in a united left government.
In the European Parliament elections, like far-right parties across Europe but most notably in Germany and Austria, the RN’s vote surged to 31.37% or 7.76 million votes. This result was a substantially improved performance in comparison with RN’s performance in the 2022 National Assembly elections (18.7%) and the Front National (RN’s name at the time) in the 2019 European elections (23.3%). The substantial growth in RN’s vote, along with the fall in votes of parties that support President Macron which collapsed from 22.42% (2019) to 14.52% (2024). Raising fears that RN would be in a strong position to win both the 2024 presidential and national assembly elections.
Map showing the political alignment with the highest vote in different localities across France on June 9 - Brown being Far-Right
In response to the poor performance of his supporters in the June 9 elections, Macron announced the dissolution of the National Assembly with the first round of new elections to be held on June 30. In announcing the dissolution, Macron said “France needs a clear majority in serenity and harmony”, a reference to the difficulty that Macron has faced with his supporters not winning a clear majority in the National Assembly in the 2022 election
Given the very different momentums between the far-right and the parties of the centre. RN and its leader Jordan Bardella are seen as being in a strong position to win a majority and form government. Indeed, Bardella has repeatedly said that the RN would only form government in its own right rather than build coalitions with other parties post the elections.
This possibility has led to significant speculation as to Macron’s motivation in taking a risk in allowing RN to form a government. One is to place pressure on the traditional Gaullist right-wing parties, most notably the Republicans, to enter into a coalition with Macron’s Rennaisance to form a government to avoid the threat of RN, or that should RN form a government that it would be in a situation of cohabitation with Macron’s presidency, which would limit the ability of an RN government to implement its agenda, and Macron potentially still able to push through legislation without reference to the national assembly via cl 49.3 of the French constitution which allows the president to declare legislation passed unless there is a vote of no confidence in the national assembly. This would require RN not only to have the largest bloc but a viable majority in the Assembly. Supporters of Macron’s approach hope that this frustration of RN’s agenda would result in dissatisfaction amongst their voters, positioning Macron and his supporters to then win the 2027 elections.
While this approach has been seen as a potentially risky but brilliant gamble the real potential risks are not going to be felt by Macron, but by the broader French population, particularly the working and popular classes and France’s marginalised communities who have historically been the target of RN’s agenda. This reality reflects the deeply cynical character of the decision to dissolve the National Assembly.
In the wake of the dissolution of the National Assembly, Éric Ciotti, the head of the Republicans has made it clear that he is willing to consider entering a coalition with not just RN, but also France’s second far-right party Reconquest which received 5.46% of the vote. This announcement resulted in an outcry within the Republicans and a move by the party’s leadership on June 12 to expel Ciotti from the Party - a move that the Paris Judicial Court overturned on June 15. On June 17, Ciotti announced that he would lead a list of 62 candidates from The Republicans in alliance with RN.
Despite Ciotti’s actions the leadership of Reconquest has refused to enter the alliance. Marion Maréchal, who was elected to the European Parliament for the party, and the niece of FN Presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, and the granddaughter of the National Front founder and long-time leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, led the negotiations with RN on behalf of Reconquest. However, when these broke down, she criticised party leader Éric Zemmourare accusing im of making too many demands, and announcing she would support the joint list between RN and Ciotti. In response Maréchal was expelled from Reconquest on June 13. Reconquest is standing their own list of candidates, but perfomance in opinion polls has collapsed to between 1-2%.
In the face of the European Election results and the dissolving of the National Assembly, there have been two linked responses from France’s left parties and broader social movements. The call for a united electoral alliance to attempt to achieve the best possible electoral outcome for the left and in parallel calls for popular mobilisations against both the dissolution of the National Assembly and the threat from the far-right.
On June 10, a call was issued for the formation of NFP to “carry a program of social and ecological ruptures to build an alternative to Emmanuel Macron and combat the racist project of the far right”. There were 11 initial signatory organisations including Rebellious France (FI), the Socialist Party (PS), the Ecologists, and the French Communist Party (PCF).
While individual leaders of the PS initially rebuffed the call, this reluctance had changed by June 14, with Raphaël Glucksmann, the leader of the PS’s European Parliamentary elections ticket announcing his support. A contributing factor to this decision would have been the announcement by former president François Hollande, who had historically been close to Macron and had endorsed Macron’s previous presidential election campaigns, that he was supporting the NFP. Hollande has been confirmed as the candidate for the constituency he represented for 22 years prior to his election to the presidency in 2012.
The FNP’s agreed platform for the election includes:
the abolition of Article 49.3 of the French Constitution;
the introduction of proportional representation for elections to the National Assembly;
organising a constituent assembly to prepare a new constitution for France, moving from the current Fifth Republic to the new Sixth Republic;
supporting a retirement age of 60 and the repeal of the 2023 French pension reform law;
introducing paid menstruation leave;
a 14% increase in the minimum wage;
re-introduction of the solidarity tax on wealth that had been abolished in 2017;
introducing a new tax on excess profits;
increasing the Generalised Social Contribution paid by the richest taxpayers;
free school lunches and supplies;
abolition the Parcoursup University Admissions system - which limits the number of university places for high school leavers;
supporting military aid to Ukraine, while committing to no direct French military intervention;
recognising the State of Palestine;
enforcing an arms embargo against Israel;
introducing gender self-identification for trans people;
abolition of universal national service
The announcement of the formation of the NFP has given significant hope to the French electorate with the NFP receiving between 26-29% support in national polls. This is close to maintaining the combined results that the NFP’s constituent parts received in the European Election of 31.58%. This consolidation of support makes it much more likely that candidates of the NFP will either be directly elected or reach the second round (when no candidate in the constituency achieves a majority of the vote. Support in polls remains consistently below the results for the RN’s polling of between 29.5-36%. The support for the NFP has given rise to concerned speculation in France’s mainstream media regarding the prospect of a NFP government, particularly one in which the FI’s leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would be prime-minister. With open speculation as to the willingness of French capital to support a RN government. Hoping to curry this support RN has announced that it would back away from promises to lower France’s taxes on fuel, power, and the broader value added tax.
The urgency of the situation has seen the far-left New Anti-Capitalist Party-Anti-Capitalist (the NPA split in 2023, the other component is the NPA-Revolutionary) announce that it would participate in the NFP. Whilst the NPA-Anti-Capitalist is small, in several constituencies, particularly around Bourdeux, where it has local councillors, it could have played a role in diffusing the left vote. The NPA-Anti-Capitalist’s participation in the NFP is significant as it and its precursors have, whilst willing to participate in negotiations around the formation of united electoral efforts, stood apart from left-electoral fronts to a large extent since 2002. This refusal has been primarily based on a desire for the formations to adopt a clear position going into elections that it would reject a governmental alliance with the PS due to the PS’s record of social liberalism in government, that is neoliberalism with a social democratic face. In announcing their participation in the NFP, the NPA - Anti-Capitalist observed “in a few days, all the left-wing political forces, unions, associations and movements working on environmental, anti-racist, feminist and LGBT+ struggles, grouped around the New Popular Front. In a few days, it is indeed our social camp, that of the exploited and oppressed, which has reconstituted itself as a political subject to defend its rights”.
The NPA-Anti-Capitalist is not alone in adding to the supporters of the NFP. There are now some 53 parties, five union confederations, and numerous social movement organistations that have joined and supporting the front.
Since June 16 there have regular protests across France called by FNP and other left and progressive social and political forces. Whilst not at the level of mass mobilisation as has been seen in France’s past they are significant. The interior ministry estimated national participation in protests across France on June 16 at 250, 000, whilst the General Confederation of Labour put participation at 640, 000 with estimates of Paris protest participation being 72, 000 and 250, 000 respectively. The details of the 117 actions against the RN across France this week can be found here.
Irrespective of the outcome of the first and second rounds of the elections. The capacity and willingness of France’s left and popular movements to build on these mobilisations play a central role. In the lead-up to the second round of elections, this will include pressuring the parties of the centre and right to work against the election RN candidates. In the wake of the second round opposing any efforts to build a coalition with RN to form government. Finally in the face of whatever government is formed to struggle for the interests of working and popular classes and marginalised communities whether against a government of the far-right, centre, or in holding the parties of the left to the NFP program.
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On May 5, the National Council of the Parti Socialiste (PS) announced that it had agreed to participate in a joint election ticket with much of France’s electoral left, via the formation of the New People's Ecologist and Social Union (NUPES) in the June legislative elections. NUPES is made up of the France Insoumise, the PS, the Parti Communiste (PCF), Europe Ecologie Les Vertes (The Greens), Génération.s (the party founded by Benoît Hamon, the PS 2017 presidential candidate in the wake of the 2017 legislative elections), and other smaller formations around these larger groups. The emergence of this electoral union follows Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s strong performance in the first round of the presidential elections. Polls suggest the bloc could emerge as either the opposition to Macron’s parliamentary supporters or if the momentum continues to build that they could be in a position to form a government following the second round. As much as this is seen as the most united the French left has been, the French far-left in the form of the New Anti-capitalist Party (NPA) and Workers Struggle (LO) remain aloof, with some raising concerns that this could undermine the ability of NUPES to reach the second round in some constituencies. In this piece, I will look at why this aloofness is a consistent position for the NPA and LO, and, at least in the case of the NPA, is not simply a reflection sectarian on the NPA’s part but instead, a continuity of the party’s position in the ongoing debate within France left on the what political basis to build a united left to challenge neoliberalism.
Mélenchon's performance in the presidential election first round
Mélenchon won 21.95% of the vote in the first round, coming in third behind Marcron (27.85%) and Le Pen (23.15%). This built on his performance in 2017 (19.6%) and 2012 (11.1%) and was the highest vote for a candidate to the left of social democracy ever (Jacques Duclos received 21.27% of the vote for the PCF in the 1969 election). However, it was in the context of a continuation of the historically low vote for the left of centre (left candidates totalled 27.31% of the vote in 2012, compared with a total vote of 43.75% in the first round of the 2012 elections).
At the launch of the NUPES’ election campaign on May 7, Mélenchon told the crowd:
“It is the first time in twenty-five years that a general agreement has been reached between all the forces of the traditional left, environmentalists and the youngest, the “rebellious”
“We had to lose the thread and have to weave it again so that, under our responsibility, we succeeded.
“What had not been done either by the leftist cartels, or by the Popular Front, or by May 68, or by the common program, we did it”
Basis of unity
The initiative to build a common left electoral block was initiated by France Insoumise reaching out to all left parties. The negotiations between left groups has given rise to essentially a unity platform for the election. This includes (the full accord is available here:
Increasing the minimum wage to 1,400 euros net (currently 1302);
The creation of a youth autonomy allowance;
The right to retire at age 60 for all;
Freezing the prices of basic necessities;
The strengthening and generalization of employee representation on boards of directors;
The repeal of the El Khomri Law and other counter-reforms of the Labour Code;
The affirmation of an imperative of ecological justice;
The development of public services, the refusal of their privatization or their opening up to competition, the creation of a public service for early childhood and support for old age;
The implementation of fairer taxation with, in particular, the restoration of the ISF and the repeal of the flat tax;
The repeal of security laws that infringe on our individual freedoms;
Real equality in the overseas territories, the right to water and the promotion of the Overseas Territories as the outposts of the ecological and solidarity bifurcation;
The adoption of a housing shield in order to limit the share of income devoted to housing, in particular by controlling rents downwards throughout the territory and the production of social housing;
Building momentum and hope
Both Mélenchon’s performance, and the emergence of the NUPES, have given rise to hope that will translate into the possibility of building a substantially bigger united left vote - that will at the very least increase the capacity of NUPES candidates to qualify for the second round and potentially win seats - including increasing the capacity of its constituents parts to increase their number of seats. The coalition currently holds 42 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly, but if their vote was consolidated they could be in a position to be the main opposition voice to Macron and his Ensemble! (not to be mistaken for Ensemble which is a far-left grouping within FI) if it forms government, or as some are hopeful based on initial polling the possibility of NUPES forming a government with Melenchon as prime minister and thus side-line Macron as president. A Radio France Internationale report that a recent Ipsos poll showed “56 per cent of voters wanted Macron to lose the legislative and go into a "cohabitation" with the left, while 57 per cent supported the left uniting to field joint candidates”. More recent polls have suggested that NUPES could receive the largest vote in the first round, how this would translate into seats in the Nationally Assembly would be heavily dependent on how the voters who back eliminated candidates in the first round allocate their votes in the second.
LO and NPA aloof
Much of the focus on parties that are standing apart from NUPES has focused on far-left parties Workers Struggle (LO) and the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA), although they are by no means the only forces standing apart with a number of PS candidates who are not in the seats that were allocated to the PS under the NUPES agreement announcing they will still stand. This focus on both LO and the NPA is primarily aimed at casting their refusal to join as being a consequence of them simply being sectarian Trotskyist forces. While this may the case with LO, who in response to the NPA’s request for discussions regarding the legislative elections, noted the NPA were involved in the discussions regarding the formation of NUPES saying:
“You present yourself as "the left of the left" with the project of "rebuilding a real left" to surf both on the disappointment of the government left and on unitary aspirations. We seek to build a revolutionary communist workers' party, totally independent of the reformist leaderships.”
These criticisms do not accurately reflect the orientation of the NPA to the process, or its criticisms, at least initially, of the new formation. The NPA was willing to meet with the FI leadership regarding joining what would become NUPES. With the NPA indicating in a statement on April 24, that they would have been willing to participate in a joint slate based on the proposed common platform - however, their hesitancy to participate was framed on the basis of who else Mélenchon and FI were willing to include, most notably the PS, their focus on securing Mélenchon the prime ministership rather than NPA’s focus on building extra-parliamentary power via the elections, a power which would be necessary regardless of whether NUPES are able to form a government. With the adherence of the PS to NUPES, the NPA ruled out participation in the coalition, as Philippe Poutou, NPA presidential candidate, said, “the NPA understood that in the end, its presence was not really desired by La France Insoumise”.
In a statement issued by the NPA national political council on May 5, they declared their orientation to NUPES candidates
“In any case, we will call for a vote and support, including actively, the left-wing candidates of the NUPES, and we will not stand candidates against them. In other constituencies, against candidates labelled NUPES who embody a continuity with social liberalism, the NPA will seek, where the conditions are met, to give voice to an alternative, though unitive candidates, from the workplaces and working-class neighbourhoods, representing a fighting left, independent of institutions and social liberalism.”
The NPA has subsequently announced that it will stand 10 candidates formally as the NPA, which has resulted in public criticism from the “Spark” faction within the party, who declared on May 26, that its members would only support direct candidates of the NPA or LO, and criticised the NPA’s leadership of maintaining illusions in NUPES.
A break with social liberalism?
The NPA drawing a hardline regarding the participation of the PS in NUPES should come as no surprise. This is not just about the reality of the PS government from 2012 in refusing to reverse the Sarkozy’s 2010 increase of the pension age, which is now a central aspect of the coalition’s platform, or the significant attacks on workers seen in the El Khomri law (which NUPES pledges to overturn) that were passed in 2016. The NPA, and its precursor the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), have had as its principal position for joining any joint electoral project, running through the discussion around both a united candidate of the left (2007) and the creation of the Left Front (2010) and all subsequent unity projects, which has been complete political independence from social liberalism in the form of the PS. The NPA/LCR has seen the willingness, particularly of the PCF, to enter into governments with the PS that have carried out attacks on social spending and workers’ rights as a key factor contributing not only to the collapse of the PS’s vote but to the position of parties to the left of the PS, particularly the PCF an issue that would come into sharp relief if either NUPES are the primary opposition party, but even more so if they were to form government reliant on the vote of PS deputies.
Prior to the PS’s national council meeting, over 1000 PS members signed an open letter against participation in NUPES, and historic leaders, such as former President François Hollande, have spoken against the union, arguing it is a “betrayal of his legacy”, which is undoubtedly the case. In response to the decision by the PS to join NUPES Carole Delopes, the president of the Occitaine region, issued a call to rally all those PS members who are opposed to the "liquidation of the party". Sections of the right have also called on the PS to run instead with them. All of this will present ongoing pressure not only on the PS electorate but also on PS deputies once elected. A key way this resistance was overcome has been both the PS and EELV being offered substantially more constituencies to stand in, particularly winnable constituencies than they would have been entitled to under initial proposals based on a proportional distribution of constituencies based on the component party’s performance in the presidential elections.
The problem of abstentionism in the working class
The refusal of LO and the NPA to join NUPES and instead run their own candidates has raised concerns that this might result in some NUPES candidates not qualifying for the second round - interestingly the role of anti-NUPES PS candidates is not being raised in these same discussions. While this may be the case in some constituencies where LO and/or the NPA might poll well, the reality is that both parties' electoral base is small - both polling less than 1% nationally. Also, because of the relatively small size, there would be no guarantee that all those who would vote for these far-left parties would follow them if they were to join NUPES - at least a section of the voters being protests against the system rather than party loyalty. More importantly, in concentrating on the potential spoiler role that LO or the NPA might play in the first round, commentators are ignoring the much bigger challenge for the left - which is to substantially eat into what is currently one of the largest voting blocs in the French working class … those who abstain from the elections entirely. This bloc, both those who refused to vote, or spoiled their vote, constituted 28.51% of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections. Shifting a solid proportion of these voters would have a significant impact on NUPES performance, far more than the less than half million votes that LO and the NPA received in the presidential elections.
Whatever the outcome of the legislative elections on June 12 and 19, the real test for France’s left will come following the elections. Either in building a consistent opposition to Macron as an opposition bloc in both the parliament and in the streets, or if results deliver a left government, the challenge of attempting to change France, which will face opposition not only from the right internationally and in France, but also, rising tensions in perspective within the left itself.
This article is posted under copyleft, verbatim copying and distribution of the entire article is permitted in any medium without royalty provided this notice is preserved. If you reprint this article please email me at revitalisinglabour@gmail.com to let me know.
Joint worker and student protest against the First Employment Contract in Rennes April 4 2006
Lisbeth Latham
Dwindling rates of industrial action - particularly in advanced capitalist countries- are often cited as evidence of the labour movement’s global decline. Yet the value of industrial action, and particularly mass strikes, are often grossly oversimplified. ‘If we strike, we will win’ may galvanise workers temporarily, but it belies the complex nature of social movements, where a willingness to struggle is only part of the formula necessary for victory. The complexity of this reality can be seen in the experiences of the contemporary French labour movement. In comparison to movements in other advanced capitalist countries, the French movement is often seen as incredibly militant and powerful. Yet, since the global financial crisis in 2008, it has suffered a series of defeats and has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise to the same extent as before. This is not to say that the French movement is any less heroic than it was in the past, but that the balance of class forces and the confidence of the French popular classes has declined. This has exposed limitations in the mass strike as an industrial tactic when it is not paired with a broader perspective of victory; winning requires not only mass involvement but also a determination to maintain struggle at times in the face of defeat.
The Mass Strike
One of the most influential works on strikes is The Mass Strike, the Political Party
and the Trade Unions written by Rosa Luxemburg in 1906[1]. She sought to explore the experiences of Russia's failed 1905 revolution and draw lessons for the broader European social democratic movement. Prior to the pamphlet’s publication, social democracy had been highly critical of mass strikes, seeing them as an anarchist fantasy, as Luxemburg put it
“the theory of the general strike as a means of inaugurating the social revolution, in contradistinction to the daily political struggle of the working-class – and exhausts itself in the following simple dilemma: either the proletariat as a whole are not yet in possession of the powerful organisation and financial resources required, in which case they cannot carry through the general strike; or they are already sufficiently well organised, in which case they do not need the general strike”[2]
Contrary to this view Luxemburg argued:
“the mass strike in Russia has been realised not as means of evading the political struggle of the working-class, and especially of parliamentarism, not as a means of jumping suddenly into the social revolution by means of a theatrical coup, but as a means, firstly, of creating for the proletariat the conditions of the daily political struggle and especially of parliamentarism. The revolutionary struggle in Russia, in which mass strikes are the most important weapon, is, by the working people, and above all by the proletariat, conducted for those political rights and conditions whose necessity and importance in the struggle for the emancipation of the working-class”[3].
The subsequent role of mass strike movements in creating legitimation crises for the capitalist class, blunting their offensive, and creating the impetus for revolutions has vindicated Luxemburg’s position[4]. At the same time mass strikes, like other tactics, have their limitations and even large mass strikes, as demonstrated by Russia in 1905, do not guarantee the successful achievement of a movement’s objectives.
The recent movements in France in defence of pensions and against labour market reforms are important experiences in demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses of the mass strike as a political tactic.
Leading into the global financial crisis the French working class had achieved a series of victories against government attacks. Most notably:
the strike wave against attacks on the public sector attacks in 1995
the movement leading up to the defeat of the referendum on endorsing the Lisbon treaty in 2005; and
the mass movement lead by students against the contrat première embauche (First Employment Contact - CPE) legislation in 2006[5]
At the same time the French organised left was in a process of breakdown and realignment. The Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) , once the hegemonic force on the French left saw its vote in presidential elections fall from 15.35% % in 1981 to 3.37% in 2002. As its old red-belt strongholds became locations of strength for the Front Nationale. deindustrialisation under successive Parti Socialiste (PS) -with the PCF as a minority partner- shattered France’s traditional heavy industrial areas[7]. The impact on the working class in these areas was devastating. Consequently, the PCF’s parliamentary representation became increasingly dependent on a non-aggression pact with the PS, who did not run candidates against sitting PCF MPs. This dependent relationship between the PCF and the PS was to become a key point of conflict in discussions regarding joint far-left candidates, with the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire (LCR) and subsequently the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste setting down a priori independence from the PS as a key basis for any discussions about united left electoral tickets[8].
It was not just the PCF who was negatively impacted; the PS suffered the indignity of running third in the 2002 presidential elections behind Jacques Chirac and Front Nationale’s (National Front - FN) Jean-Marie Le Pen[9]. Whilst some blamed this embarrassment on the shock results of the Trotskyist LCR (4.25%) and Lutte Ouvrière (5.72%) candidates, it still posed the question of why people weren’t voting for the PS. It also failed to explain why workers were voting for small far-left parties instead, or even abstaining from voting at all. This put the left in the position of having to respond to a presidential run-off between the right and the far-right - an unenviable position which was repeated in 2017 with the runoff between Macron and Marine Le Pen.
2009 Post GFC Movement
Triggered by the mass defaulting of subprime mortgages in the US economy and exacerbated by the failure of the mortgage backed securities which underwrote the loans, the GFC of 2007-2008 spread like an infection through the global financial sector. Yet as governments scrambled to bailout high finance, they also sought to shift the cost onto working people.[10]
In France this response was met with mass resistance. The intersyndicale (an informal alliance of union confederations at a national level) called for mass mobilisations against the policies of Sarkozy and the Fillon government. Their demands included:
Increases in the minimum wage and payments to the unemployed and pensioners;
Increased social spending on public housing;
Action to reduce job losses including bans on redundancies at profitable companies;
Reversal of the tax cuts given to the rich at the start of the crisis;
Reversal of job losses and restructuring of the public sector[11]
The intersyndicale achieved a series of mass mobilisations throughout 2009, the largest of which was the general strike of March 19 which drew over 3 million people[12]. Despite these mobilisations the coalition was unable to force any real concessions from the government and, as they progressed, the mobilisations lost impetus.
This development was not a surprise to all the union leaderships. One of France’s most militant union confederations, the openly anti-capitalist Solidaires, consistently argued for a need to go beyond individual days of mobilisation. Solidaires predicted that, however successful, individual days of mobilisation alone would not be enough to steer the government from its well-worn course of protecting capital at the expense of working people. Instead, Solidaires argued for the need to build towards a renewable general strike[13]. As evidence of the effectiveness of this approach they pointed to the successful strikes by workers in the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe from January to March of that year. Although Solidaires leadership did concede under pressure from other unions that capacity for such action did not exist, they argued that the work still needed to be done. Affirming the movement’s need and capacity to mobilise on both a mass and ongoing basis would be more productive than simply acknowledging and accepting its inadequacies, they felt[14].
As 2009 continued the movement declined. By 13 June the once three million-strong movement had plummeted to a mere 150, 000 and was essentially over, having achieved very little in the way of concessions. At the same time, the state was preparing a new wave of attacks on working people, this time in the form of an assault on France’s pension system.
Joint mobilisation against the attack on France's Pension System 2010
2010 Pension Struggle
In early 2010, the Fillon government announced that it was seeking to change France’s pension system. The proposed changes included raising the retirement age and increasing workers’ contributions to the social security scheme - effectively requiring workers to work more hours over a greater duration of their lifetimes.
In the wake of this announcement, the Intersyndicale resumed meeting in earnest. Their concerns were well-founded. Though Fillon’s attack on the pension system threatened to disadvantage all workers, its impacts would be felt most acutely by women, significantly reducing the number of women expected to qualify for a full pension and exacerbating the problem of French women retiring into poverty.
From the outset, the unions were divided in their view of the objectives of the movement. The class-struggle unions (combat syndicales), whose membership includes Solidaires (Solidarity), Force Ouvrière (Workers Force - FO), and large sections of both the Federation Syndicale Unitaire (FSU) and Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) wanted the proposals to be totally withdrawn. The more conservative unions, most notably the Confédération française démocratique du travail (French Confederation of Democratic Workers - CFDT) and Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers - CFTC) were more conciliatory, seeking greater consultation with the government regarding the changes. Yet despite these differences, there was eventually a basis for a common united movement involving France’s eight main union confederations and federations - although the early movement involved just five[15].
Initially, the 2010 movement was far smaller than the previous years with the March protests reaching only 800, 000 nationally. These disappointing numbers inevitably gave rise to commentary that the defeat of 2009 had undermined the mobilising capacity of the movement. However, as the year progressed the movement began to grow and the pace of mobilisations increased. By 24 June mobilisations had reached 1.92 million. Numbers continued to grow as the legislation worked its way through France’s legislative processes in September and October. Ultimately, there were seven mobilisations, all exceeding two million people and peaking at 3.5 million. However, the total number of people involved in the movement is likely to have been far greater[16].
Solidaires Adverstisment calling for a genderal strike on September 9, 2010
Significantly, in a number of industries the days of mobilisation were linked by strike action. Initially these renewable strikes began in France’s oil refineries - triggered by a struggle around Total’s plans to close its Dunkirk refinery[17]. Yet the movement also spread to other sectors. This spread was facilitated, in part, by a decision within the intersyndicale to allow industrial action in workplaces, and at the municipal level, to be initiated by general assemblies of workers at those levels. This meant that, in those sectors and regions where the more militant unions had greater influence, they were able to link protracted strikes to the mobilisations, which were then called and supported by all unions between the punctuating mass mobilisations. Under France’s Labour Code and constitution, if one union in a workplace issues a strike notice then any worker can participate regardless of their union affiliation. While there were a number of spaces where renewable strikes were in effect, the most important of these was in the oil refineries whose closure massively disrupted fuel supplies across France[18].
Despite the size and escalating character of the movement the government pushed ahead with passing the legislation. In the wake of the passing of the legislation in November, there was one more joint mass mobilisation on November 23. The interior ministry estimated the protests size at 52, 000 and the unions did not announce a size estimate. This small mobilisation indicated that the movement had effectively collapsed. The more conservative unions withdrew from the campaign on the promise that the legislation, whose impact was not immediate but delayed, could be defeated via the election of a PS government in 2012.Those workers who remained on strike - most notably the oil refinery workers - became increasingly isolated as the movement collapsed. In Marseille, a city controlled by the PS, municipal workers were forced back to work using legislation introduced by the de Vilipin government the year before[19]. This legislation, which guaranteed minimum essential services during strikes, was anti-worker by design and undermined a number localised strikes that were holding out against the collapse of the broader movement
Mobilisation in Marseille March 18, 2006
Movement against the First Employment Contract
In 2006, the de Villipin government had sought to introduce the CPE, a change in France’s employment laws which would have weakened the rights of workers under the age of 26, including allowing employers to dismiss young workers aged between 18-26 without notice or reason during their first two years of employment[20]. By targeting just younger workers, the de Villepin government hoped that by focusing on one section of the workforce they could divide and limit any potential opposition movement.
Initially this was the case, as there was limited united resistance by the union confederations[21]. However, despite the lack of leadership from workers’ unions, high school and university students, primarily organised via the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France (National Union of Students of France), Fédération indépendante et démocratique lycéenne (Independent and Democratic High School Federation), and the Union Nationale Lycéenne (National Union of Secondary Students) began their own mass mobilisations - shutting down schools and universities and driving mass mobilisations of students. These student mobilisations gave impetus for militants within the union confederations to push to support the student protests[22]. Between the rising peaks of mass mobilisations, student pursued a broader goal of disrupting the economy via their own collective actions and concentrated on building alliances with workers to support and exacerbate the disruption. By March 2006, 68 of France’s 89 universities were either occupied or on strike with many high schools across France barricaded shut by striking students[24]. More spectacular were the student occupations of rail lines or the successful blocking of Airbus airliners being transported from manufacturing plants[25].
As inspiring as the movement was, it was not significantly bigger or more disruptive than the 2010 movement. What really differentiated the 2006 movement against the CPE from the 2010 movement to defend pensions was that when the CPE was passed, the movement continued. In passing the legislation in 2006, the de Villepin government gambled that passing of the legislation would dissipate the movement and remove the threat to French state and capital[26]. When the movement continued despite the legislation passing the threat effectively expanded with no hope that it would decline in the short-term. In response to the movement’s determination, the government retreated and the legislation, despite passing, became a dead letter[27].
The lesson to be drawn from comparing the events of 2006 and 2010 is not that mass movements are no longer capable of winning, or that strikes are no longer crucial to achieving victory in industrial and political struggles. It is instead that these struggles are ultimately battles of will and endurance. What changed between 2006 and 2010 was not the capacity of the movement to mobilise- indeed the 2010 movement was arguably larger in size than the 2006 mobilisations. No, what differed between them was the determination of the ruling class to persist with their attacks on working people and, even more crucially, the ability in 2006 of the more radical sections of the movement, most notably the student unions, to cohere and mobilise after the passing of the legislation. It is not sufficient for our movements to be massive or powerful. In order to be victorious,the will and determination of workers must be strong enough to outlast that of capital and its governments. Escalating and disruptive action is thus most effective when deployed as a means of undermining capital’s confidence and endurance. The continuation of the mass movement of 2006 and consequent disruption of the economy cast the gamble made by the right to push forward with legislation as a grievous error, creating the fear that the movement would not stop. By contrast in 2010, the government’s bet proved correct, the movement did collapse and the state and capital could both be confident not only to maintain that round of attacks but contemplate and implant further attacks on working people.
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Since the brutal murder of Samuel Paty in October, there has been a ramping up of rhetoric from the French government against the Muslim community in France. This rhetoric came to a head with the announcement of draft legislation to prevent “Islamic Separatism” by French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin which makes more explicit the state's vision of the Muslim community as a threat to the Government’s vision of Republican values. This attack on the Muslim community, and any critics of racism, islamophobia, or colonialism within French society – is paired with the introduction of new security laws that would further protect France’s repressive state apparatus from scrutiny for violence against France’s social movements -repression which has been dramatically escalating since the declaration of a state of emergency following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015.
On October 16, Paty, a history teacher, was murdered in Paris, he was publicly beheaded by Abdullakh Anzorov, an 18-year-old Chechen refugee from Russia. The brutal murder had been motivated by Paty’s sharing with students, in a class on freedom of expression, satirical images of the Prophet Mohammed published by Charlie Hedbo in 2015, which had provoked a terror attack on the office of that publication and across Paris. Paty’s display of the images caused significant anger not only within France’s Muslim community, but globally, and followed a familiar pattern of anger at the previous publication of similar images globally. This included the sharing of a video by Abdelhakim Sefrioui an Imam describing the Paty as a thug and denouncing him for displaying the pictures and arguing he should be disciplined.
In the wake of the murder, President Emmanuel Macron described the attack as “a typical Islamist terrorist attack”, whilst describing the motivation of Paty’s murder as being “for teaching children freedom of speech”. Seven people were quickly arrested. This included students who had pointed the teacher out to the killer, Sefrioui, and Brahim Chnina a parent of a student at the school who had protested outside the school and sought a meeting with the school’s principal with Sefrioui’s support. Darmanin made a public statement indicating that up to 51 institutions faced dissolution including BarrakaCity and Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France (Collective Against Islamaphobia in France – CCFI) which he described as being “enemies of the Republic”, and threatened to move to dissolve them. This was despite the fact that there was no evidence that the CCIF, which was formed in 2003 to monitor and combat Islamophobia in France, making any statement supporting the attacks. Darmanin went further arguing that it was an “Islamist dispensary”. French Minister of Education, Jean-Michel Blanquer, also argued that indigenist, racialist, and “decolonial” ideologies,’ imported from North America, were responsible for ‘conditioning’ the violent extremist who assassinated school teacher – a position endorsed by a manifesto of 100 academics published in Le Monde on November 1. This attack on anti-racist academics has prompted a counter open letter against the threat of "threat of academic authoritarianism"
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On November 9, Darmanin announced the final draft of the “law confirming republican principles”. This legislation contained the following proposals:
An extension France’s public school student ID system to students enrolled in private schools;
Make it an offence to share online information which allows an individual to be identified;
Provision for summary trials of individuals accused of “online hate speech”;
Make it illegal to intimidate public officials, including teachers;
Will allow judges to bar individuals convicted of certain offences, such as provocation of acts of terrorism, or incitement of discrimination, hatred, or violence – from entering places of worship;
Requiring associations seeking public funding to agree to "respect the principles and values of the republic" and return the money if found to have flouted the rules;
All foreign donations above €10,000 must be declared.
While not stipulated in the bill, the government has requested that France’s Muslim federations form a national council of imams. This council will be in charge of proclaiming new imams. The council must also draft a charter of "republican values", which will stipulate that Islam is a religion and not a political movement in France.
While on the face of it some aspects of this legislation could be seen as necessary protections or limitations, the reality is they are both very vague and open to abuse. This combined with the fact that they are aimed at France’s marginalized Muslim community specifically, rather than France’s Catholic-inspired far-right and neo-fascist organisations reflects a racist vision, shared throughout many western countries, that Muslim communities are the real threat rather than far-right extremist groups.
Coinciding with this assault on the rights of France’s Muslim community. Has been the release of the draft legislation of the “Global Security Law”. This law:
authorizes the police and gendarmes to film their interventions by "mobile cameras", to access the images they have recorded and to transmit them in real-time to the command post;
authorizes the deployment of drones to monitor public space;
prohibits the public from disseminating "the image of the face or any other element of identification of an official of the national police or of a soldier of the national gendarmerie when acting within the framework of "a police operation" and when this dissemination is made "with the aim of harming his physical or mental integrity”.
This new legislation has created considerable anger in the context here over the past five years, there have been escalating levels of repression against France’s social movements, most notably the Yellow Jackets, labour and students movements – with “non-lethal” weapons being regularly deployed at protests resulting in injuries, most notably the maiming and death of protestors – with riot squad units in both the CRS (Republican Security Companies) within the National Police and gendarmerie (France’s national police force which is part of the military) acting with impunity against the social movements.
While releasing two such anti-democratic and repressive pieces of legislation would normally be a tactical error, as it would provide an opportunity to unite an even more diverse array of social forces against the bills, in this case, it is likely to have the opposite effect. This is because like the rest of French society, much of the French left and other progressive forces hold deeply Islamophobic outlooks, which are justified on the basis on the need to defend laïcité (the French concept of secularism) and women’s rights. However, these actions, particularly the bans on the wearing of the veil and attempts to control the Muslim community, are premised on anti-secular, racist, and sexist ideas about the right of the state to control not just how people practice their religions, but its right to control the lives of women within the Muslim community.
In the past sections of the French left have supported the ban on the wearing of the hijab in public schools, bans on the burqa and niqab, and participated in attacks on other left parties, like the Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (New Anti-Capitalist Party – NPA), who have stood candidates who wore the hijab. There have also been broader problems of the left being slow or inconsistent in their response to attacks on the Muslim community in France. While some of the left have been very clear regarding their rejection of this attack on the Muslim community, most notably the NPA, other parties have not been so explicit, the Communist Party and France Insoumise however have both argued that while they argue that the law fails to address the marginalization of significant sections of French society and instead seeks to hide the social crisis behind the stigmatization of Muslim communities.
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Last night, we learned that the Ministry of the Interior had just notified, by mail, the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France - CCIF) of its intention to initiate a plan to dissolve. Gerald Darmanin[1] thus carried out his threatened action and claimed to be acting "in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister".
By attacking this organization whose role is to combat Islamophobic violence and discrimination, especially including through the support of victims and the publication of an annual report on Islamophobia in France, the government is taking a further step in its authoritarian state policy.
While the content of the pre-bill "separatism" (renamed "strengthening republican principles") has just been made public, confirming that the government continues its headlong authoritarian and Islamophobic rush, the desire to silence the CCIF and, through it, those who stand up against stigmatisation and discrimination against Muslims, is revolting.
Thus, the Minister of the Interior who wants to ban the denunciation of police violence also wants to prohibit the denunciation of Islamophobia. Everyone should understand that these are two sides of the same policy, whose aim is to silence any criticism of their "republican order", at a time when the government's bankrupt failure to manage the health crisis makes it fear social explosions.
The NPA condemns this attack on the CCIF and assures its facilitators and volunteers of all its support in their indispensable action against Islamophobia. It is the whole of the social movement and the labour movement that should now stand against this new authoritarian measure: the future of the anti-racist struggle and, more generally, all the struggles of our social camp are at stake.
[1] Minister of the Interior in the government of Prime Minister Jean Castex
Since December 5, France has been gripped by ongoing strikes and mobilisations by a coalition of trade unions, high school and university student unions, as well as the gilet jaunes (yellow vests) to defeat the attack by the Macron and the Philippe government on France’s pension system. Whilst the alliance has been able to sustain a period of heightened mobilisations that have put the government under pressure, it remains unclear that the movement is powerful to defeat the attack, and there are serious barriers if the movement is to expand and grow.
Pension Counter Reforms
During the 2017 election campaign, Macron promised that he would look to “reform” France’s pension system. The current attacks both build on the changes to the pension system pushed through by the Sarkozy and Fillon government in 2010, and the failed attacks on the Special Retirement Plans for workers in a number of public services and recently privatised companies, launched in 1995 and 2007. These attacks have been justified on the need to make the pension system sustainable in the face of France’s ageing population (France’s pension system relies on pensions being paid out on the payments of current workers, with excess payments going into an investment fund).
The changes affecting the majority of French workers would increase the age which workers could access their pensions to 64 (in 2027) up from 62 years of age currently (Pivot Age), increase the period of time that workers have to have been working in order to qualify for a full pension from 42 to 43 years, and increase the age at which workers can retire on a full-pension without which working the minimum qualifying years work (Equalising Age).
The Special Retirement Plans refer to 42 different pension schemes received by workers in 15 organisations including rail workers with SNCF (French National Railway Company) and RATP (Autonomous Operator of Parisian Transportation), members of the Paris Opera, lawyers, members of the army, sailors, and the National Police. Workers in these primarily public organisations had had pension schemes (some of them dating back to Louis XIV) that had been in place prior to the introduction of the national pension scheme in October 1945. The Special Retirement Plans, tend to allow earlier retirement – many of these jobs are extremely physically strenuous, provide for workers to receive a higher defined benefit than the standard pensions, and have better indexation (the standard pension is indexed at inflation, whilst the majority of the Special Retirement Plan pensions provide for workers to have their pensions to be indexed with wage increases in their former industry). This attack on these has been justified on the basis of providing transparency and equality to the French pension system and would also secure the financial basis of the pensions in these plans (all of which are in sectors in which there have had significant contraction in employment and so there are substantial more retirees dependent on the pensions than workers contributing to the schemes), with the aim of splitting opposition to the pension reform.
Union Responses
Opposition to the proposed changes have been premised on four major arguments:
First that the changes will disproportionately affect women, who due to the socialised norms around responsibility for child-rearing means that women are more likely to have substantial career breaks and already many French women are unable to qualify for a full-pension prior to reaching pivot age, unions argue that increasing both the qualifying period and the full-pension age will cast greater numbers of women poverty in retirement - currently, women who have children are given credit towards their pension qualification, 1 year per child in the public sector, two-years per child in the private section, the proposed changes would remove this. Women currently receive 29% of the pensions of men, however, the CGT (Confédération générale du travail - General Confederation of Labour) expects this gap to rise to 42% if the current protections for women are removed as proposed.
Secondly, that increases in the pension ages mean that workers will increasingly be unable to retire prior to the onset of the illnesses of old age, and so fewer and fewer workers will be able to have a healthy period of retirement prior to the onset of these illnesses.
Your pharmacist recommends retirement before arthritis
Thirdly, the changes will unfairly impact workers who work in more physically demanding
industries. These workers currently are able to retire earlier, the extension of the pension age will put heavy pressure on the bodies of these workers to be able to work to the new pension age. Whilst the government has pulled back on the removal for some categories of workers, notably police and firefighters, sewage workers, who on average die seven years earlier than other workers and 17 years earlier than managers, will lose their current early retirement.
Finally, that workers who lose their jobs later in their working lives, who already find it difficult to obtain work, will have to face a longer period of either unemployment or underemployment prior to reaching the pension age.
Convergence of struggles
The present movement draws together separate struggles that have been occurring in France during the Macron presidency. The left has, and the more militant unions have sought to draw together and converge the existing struggles within French society into the pension struggle. This has included pre-existing workers' struggles but has also included movements of students that have campaigned against both fees and the introduction of increased university entrance requirements which has seen thousands of young people fail to gain entrance to university and the introduction of increased student fees for international students and the mobilisation of thousands of university and high school students which has seen schools and universities blockaded and the call for exams to be totally cancelled to allow the full involvement of students in the movement. This process of convergence is not new, and his been an objective of a range of militant organisations since prior to the Macron presidency, and particularly in relation to the emergence of the Front Social and the Nuit Debout during struggle against the El Khomri attacks on the Labour Law and the gilet jaunes as a new force mobilisation which, since November 2018, has drawn into motion sections of the French popular classes that unions and other progressive forces have not been able to mobilise for an extended period of time.
State and Government Responses
In response to the mass movement the state, just as it has to other mobilisation since the November 2015 introduction of the (withdrawn in November 2017) state of emergency following the terror attacks in Paris, has responded with escalating repressive violence. There has been widespread footage of CRS (Republican Security Companies) and Gendarme riot police beating protestors, as well the deployment of a range of “non-lethal” weapons, including explosive tear gas grenades (France is the only European country to deploy explosive canisters in law enforcement) and flash balls, that has seen a steady rise in the number of people who have been maimed at protests.
In addition, the government has sought to manoeuvre in the hope of dividing and blunting the movement. The tactic has been the announcement of the “temporary” withdrawal of the first phases of the increase in the Pivot Age, that had been scheduled to begin in 2022. A withdrawal that is based on finding an alternative way of saving €12 billion “in order to secure the system by 2027” - the government has proposed a conference on January 30 to identify alternative mechanisms to make savings in the pension system. The “concessions” have primarily been aimed at the conservative unions, particularly the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du travail - French Democratic Confederation of Labour - the largest French confederation when measured by the number of members and second-largest in employee representative bodies) and UNSA (L'Union nationale des syndicats autonomes - National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions, which is the second most popular union within both the SNSF and RAPT), who have responded positively to the concessions, with CFDT general secretary Berger calling the withdrawal of the 2022 Pivot Age phase-in date a victory for the CFDT and called on CFDT members to desist from participating in strikes and mobilisations against the pension reform. However, the more militant unions have rejected the overtures of the government, arguing that legislation is not amendable and that it should be withdrawn. The CGT, in a January 11 statement said, “that debate on the Pivot Age is simply aimed at winning the support of certain unions”. Léon Crémieux, a militant in SUD Rail, the trade union Solidaires union within the SNSF and RAPT, and leader of the NPA (Nouveau parti anticapitaliste - New Anticapitalist Party), argues that the conference is a trap which “ is going to close quickly since this conference will only be able to put the “pivotal age at 64” back in the frame, forcing retirement two years later, or lengthening the number of years worked necessary to retire (43 years today)”. SUD Rail, in a statement on January 24, said it would refuse to meet with the government and would continue to mobilise its members until the withdrawal of the bill.
The current movement has significant weaknesses
Despite significant public support, opinion polls suggest that support for the movement has reached peaks of 65%, however, the movement has failed to not only meet that level of support but the size and breadth of the major working-class mobilisations of the past three decades.
This has meant that the current movement is substantially bigger and longer-lasting than the peak of the counter government movements of the last decade, but the movement is substantially smaller than the big movements against government attacks against the working class of the last three decades, particularly the movements of 1995, 2003, and 2010. In 1995, the movement was primarily within the public sector, and was not directly supported by the more conservative unions particularly the CFDT, but were driven by the CGT and FO (Force ouvriere - Workers Force) - however, the more militant unions were able to draw much broader layers of the working class, including significant sections of the CFDT’s membership and support base, into motion. 2003 the movement against the first employment contract, which focused on the employment rights of young workers,, was primarily driven by mobilisations by students and education workers. The 2010 movement to defend the pension system, peaked at mobilisations of 3.5 million, and seven mobilisations of more than 2 million across eight weeks, in addition there indefinite strikes in a number of industries particularly oil refining which resulted in widespread fuel shortages. However despite the larger size of these earlier movements, they at best achieved partial victories, and in the case of 2010 movement, it failed totally and demobilised on the promise that a future Parti Socialiste (PS) government would repeal the changes - which the PS government never attempted to do, instead it introduced new attacks on the unions and France’s working class. Defeats which have contributed to the current inability of the movement to spread.
At the same time the ability of the movement to sustain itself and force the government to offer “concessions” has given hope that perhaps the movement can outlast the resilience of the government or potentially capital. Importantly, the movement has been expanding, the more than 200 mobilisations across France on January 24, drew an estimated 1.3 million people onto the street up from 800, 000 on January 16. At the centre of the struggle has been the strikes within the SNCF and RATP with 45 days of strike action which ended January 24. This strike was initiated by the militant union federation within both SNCF and RATP, and was primarily built on the back of the September strike within RATP against pension reform. Other key areas have been the depth of the struggle within France’s cultural institutions particularly the Paris Opera, which has been on strike and performing at the mass demonstrations in Paris, the Louvre, and the French National Library, the blockading of oil refineries which occurred between January 8 to 11. On January 24, the CGT stated it was seeking to initiate discussions with workers in those workplaces not yet on strike, to draw them into action. This is occurring through the holding of general assemblies of workers and at the workplace and municipal level. Whilst the inability to draw the more conservative unions, particularly the CFDT consistently into the movement is a real weakness and break on the movement’s potential to mobilise, it potentially could be a strength, as it reduces the influence of the CFDT on the movement and government cannot rely on the CFDT’s sudden withdrawal from the movement, which happened in 2010 after the pension changes were passed, to undermine and demobilise the movement. This has the potential to place considerable additional pressure on the government, as it is less likely, compared to 2010, that the movement will simply evaporate following the passing of any legislation. Added to this, with the splintering of the PS in the wake of the 2017 presidential elections, it is hard for more conservative forces to advocate an electoral solution to addressing the assault on pensions.
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The current national intersyndicale which brings together the CGT, FO, CGC-CFE (Confédération française de l'encadrement - Confédération générale des cadres - CFE-CGC), the trade union Solidaires, FSU (Fédération syndicale unitaire - Unitary Union Federation), FIDL ( Fédération indépendante et démocratique lycéenne - Independent and Democratic High School Federation), MNL (Mouvement national lycéen - National High School Student Movement), UNL (L’Union nationale lycéenne - The National High School Union), and UNEF (Union Nationale des Étudiants de France - National Union of Students of France) has called for three further days of mobilisation on January 29, 30, and 31. These days of mobilisation will be an important test as to the direction of the movement’s inertia.
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"I would be annoyed to make the umpteenth unitary call," warned Olivier Besancenot. Yes but here it is: the radical left resembles, in the aftermath of the Europeans, a "field of ruins". This is why the spokesman of the Parti Nouveau Anticapitaliste (NPA) on Sunday called "all those camps the resistant to Macron and to the far right" to act and to be heard "together". He invites the militants of France Insoumise, the Lutte Ovrière, the libertarian organizations, the Générations, the Communist Party, the anti-fascist organizations, the ecologists, the district militants, the syndicalists and all those who find themselves "intuitively in a space both anti-capitalist and internationalist policies" to "collective action". "What we miss is not a captain, a coach. It is to act together, " urged the spokesman of the NPA. As for the RN (National Rally [Marine Le Pen's new party]), "the worst enemy of the working class", its strength is explained above all by "the weakness of the left forces".
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste
Tuesday, May 28 2019
The results of the European elections confirm the political crisis in France as in Europe: 50% abstention, votes for the extreme right very high, government parties globally discredited but which safeguard their electoral capital. Against capitalism, for social justice, there is still a voice for the world of work. The extreme right threatens
As in 2014, the National Gathering comes first, based on the rejection of the European Union to deflect anger in the field of racism and the struggle of all against all.
With its associates in Italy, Belgium or Hungary, it embodies a mortal danger: that of the fiercest competition between the countries, with the dramatic consequences that would ensue for the popular classes, for women, for immigrants, and for all democratic and social rights.
Government parties save their seats
Although completely disavowed by the mobilizations of these past months, Macron and LREM managed to limit the damage. Similarly, in Germany and the Spanish state, the right or the PS are maintained although their policies have also been rejected by the people. These forces will dominate the future European Parliament, which shows once again the undemocratic nature of these institutions.
These formations are like ramparts against the extreme right. But it is the policies they lead, of social rights, privatization, contempt against the working classes, which actually feed the extreme right.
The Greens scored high on growing environmental concerns and mobilization for climate justice. With around 30% of the vote, the left parties are globally at their lowest, paying for their participation in liberal policies, particularly in the context of the European Union, their division and the difficulties of social mobilization that are struggling to win.
Fight, debate, build
The economic, social, ecological crisis will continue to grow stronger and the choice to make is more and more clear: is the far right taking more and more space - up to the taking of power? - because the government parties will not stop the far-right's progress, or will the world of work manage to overcome its weaknesses to build a real alternative to liberal and/or nationalist policies?
It is futile to want to arrange the system. We need a radical left, independent of the institutions, anti-capitalist and internationalist, for the revolutionary break with the system, whose centre of gravity is the concrete defence of the world of work.
There is an urgent need to build a political representation for all the exploited. Without denying the disagreements that exist, by the discussion and the confrontation of the points of view, we want to work for the unity of our social camp, to be able to unite to act against the government, against the repression, for our social demands, democratic and ecological. It is already possible to coordinate so that the struggles win together instead of losing one after the other.
For these mobilizations, to this work of construction, urgent and necessary, the NPA intends to do our all to play our part.
Revitalising Labour attempts to reflect on efforts to rebuild the labour movement internationally, emphasising the role that left-wing political currents can play in this process. It welcomes contributions on union struggles, internal renewal processes within the labour movement and the struggle against capitalism and imperialism.