Europe: Facing the “crisis of our time”

Henri Wilno
International Viewpoint
August 2012

During the 1930s, US president Herbert Hoover liked to say that recovery was “just around the corner”. During the current crisis and most especially in Europe it would be difficult to count the number of statements by leaders (Nicolas Sarkozy was a specialist at this) periodically announcing either the end of the crisis, or more prudently, for example after a European summit, that we are now on the right road.

The situation in June and July 2012 shows, if it were necessary, that nothing of the sort is true. After so many European summits presented as decisive, the Spanish bank crisis combined with the situation in Greece marks a new stage of the financial crisis in Europe.

At almost any time, there could be an acceleration of events in the Euro zone leading to a serious undermining of the single currency and a banking crisis. In this context, it is especially interesting to consider the possible trajectories of European construction.

The economic crisis cannot be reduced to the European crisis
An erroneous vision of the situation tends to be advanced by some economists and journalists: the current phase of the crisis would be linked to the financial difficulties of the Euro zone and this latter would imperil the whole of the world economy. Some leaders, notably those in the United Kingdom and US President Barack Obama, find it useful to project onto Europe the responsibility for the bad conjuncture in their countries. Thus the British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne told the “Sunday Telegraph” on June 10: “our recovery – already facing powerful headwinds from high oil prices and the debt burden left behind by the boom years – is being killed off by the crisis on our doorstep.”
There is no doubt that the situation in the Euro zone amplifies the crisis but the latter is far from being summed up thus. In fact, as Alex Callinicos puts it in an article entitled “The crisis of our times” [1], there are three dimensions to the current situation:

• the weakness of US and European growth, showing that the initial causes of the crisis have not been surmounted: the accumulated weight of debt, uncertainties about the bank balance sheets, compression of wage demand;
• the paralysis of the main dominant classes of the Western countries torn by their divisions: ultra neoliberal Republicans vs. Democrats in the USA, divisions between countries in Europe;
• the end of the illusion that the emergent economies and notably China could come to the aid of the OECD economies.
  

The uncertainties about world growth have been confirmed by the new projections of the IMF published in mid July, 2012 which note that the recovery of the world economy is showing new signs of weakness.

The economic crisis cannot then be reduced to the European crisis. However, Europe certainly appears as the weak link in the current configuration of capitalism. The Euro zone is indeed experiencing the most calamitous growth of all the big economic zones (-0.3% in 2012, +0.7% in 2013 according to the IMF projections) and its recession in 2012, through the slowing up of its imports, weakens world trade and thus the activity of other countries. It could be added that its financial crisis (the situation of the banks, public debt) increases world uncertainty.

A structural crisis of the Euro zone
Michel Husson’s study "Political economy of the Euro system” analyses the current crisis of the Euro zone with regard to its structural contradictions. At the risk of being schematic, his reasoning can be summed up in three points:

1. The countries of Southern Europe have lost competitiveness because of high inflation of a structural nature. The latter stems from the process of catch-up (more rapid growth), the mode of training of employees in services and what he characterises in his text as a “distribution conflict” linked to income inequality.
2. The early years of the Euro allowed the countries of Southern Europe to benefit from lower real interest rates (that is, taking inflation into account) than the countries of the North and the possibility of “risk free” trade deficits. The situation changed with:
• the policy of wage squeeze in Germany introduced by the Schroeder government (with the Hartz reforms) which improved German competitiveness and thus strongly reduced that of its partners.
• the crisis and the policies implemented to deal with it, which have increased public deficits and the rate of indebtedness of states and seen the reappearance of external constraints through the interest rates the states have to pay to refinance themselves.
3. Resolving the debt problem would not deal with the structural difficulties resulting from the heterogeneity of the countries of the zone and the absence of sufficiently serious resources for a convergence policy (weakness of the community budget and so on).

These three elements are especially pertinent. We see now the consequences of the neoliberal turn of European construction. The European Union has always been in its very conception a project of capitalist integration but its development has involved a passage from “Keynesian” economic policies to a neoliberal mode of economic regulation. We can date this turn from the Single European Act, signed in 1986 and entering into force in 1987.

What potential trajectory?
There is however room for discussion around the conclusions that Husson draws from this analysis and concerning the potential trajectory of the EU. One senses some hesitations in reading the text. Husson specifies in his first paragraph that “there are only two responses adapted to the structural nature of the European crisis: either the breakup of the Euro system, or its radical refoundation. The others confine themselves to staggering the contradictions over time or programming a socially unacceptable regression”. At the end of the text he specifies: “the only coherent road is that of cooperative harmonisation. This would rest on a European budget based on a unified tax on capital incomes which would finance the necessary transfers (a harmonisation fund) and socially and ecologically useful investment”. He recalls correctly that the “sweet” variant of the dominant policies (in the manner of Hollande) prolongs the current situation and leads to decades of adjustment imposed on the peoples of Europe. And finally puts forward a variant based on a national but non-nationalist rupture with neoliberal capitalism (with a reference to the programme advanced by Syriza during the Greek elections of 2012).

The debate here goes back to those of nearly a century ago. Leon Trotsky examined thus the possible outcomes of the First World War: “ In the case of an “undecided” issue of the war, Liszt thinks the indispensability of an economic and military understanding of the European Great Powers would come to the fore against weak and backward peoples, but above all, of course, against their own working masses. We pointed out above the colossal hindrances that lie in the way of realizing this program. The even partial overcoming of these hindrances would mean the establishment of an imperialist Trust of European States, a predatory share-holding association. The proletariat will in this case have to fight not for the return to “autonomous” national states, but for the conversion of the imperialist state trust into a Republican European Federation.” [2]

We can discuss the concrete relevance of Trotsky’s analyses of the time. But the concerns which underlie them remain pertinent. Certainly, as has been said above, the European Union is a capitalist project, and that has been strengthened with the Single Act and the Euro. But this does not reduce the illusory, indeed dangerous character of national inflections.

In fact, the question is: how can Europe, and more particularly the Euro zone, survive the crisis? This crisis is a “big crisis”, “the crisis of our time” as Callinicos puts it. We could specify the different potential trajectories as follows, trying not to mix the possible with the desirable:

• the realist scenario today implemented in the “German” manner is that of an adjustment based on “social savagery” and Hollande’s scenario is only a variant of it
• these hard line scenarios have a rationality (contrary to what many critical economist think) and they can succeed;
• but they can also founder on national and/or social contradictions and end up with a redrawing or complete breakup of the Euro zone.
• the capitalist “cooperative and European" scenario is unlikely;
• the most probable progressive scenarios are seemingly national ones, but they are not without risk.

The dominant scenario risks break-up
Economists of a progressive Keynesian inspiration tend to stress the limits and illusions of the austerity remedies summed up today by the macro-economic policies advocated by the European Union, for which the Troika (ECB, European Commission, IMF) now constitutes the strong arm. It is indeed perfectly correct that austerity weighs down on activity and public income and thus makes deficit reduction more difficult. But leaving it at this would be a superficial analysis. The economist Costas Lapavitsas has tried to shed light on the rational core of the German policy: “By insisting that everyone must “become German” they [the German leaders] are basically saying that countries with deficits should accept permanent austerity while applying permanent pressure on their workers. They are probably hoping that this would lead to a new equilibrium at a lower level of income across Europe, and perhaps after several years there might be renewed conditions for general growth, somehow”. [3]

In fact, as Yves Salesse has pointed out, the EU is without any doubt a capitalist Europe but it is not “the Europe of capital” in the sense that the big European companies are not the motor force of its construction. Big European capital, financial but also industrial, is globalising and alliances between firms are based on this logic. Rapprochements sometimes take place between European firms, not seeking to constitute “European champions” but above all with regard to the state of the world market. Generally, the links of these firms with national territories grow more distant. A significant part of their profits are realised on non-European markets and their nationality only becomes important in periods of crisis: to obtain aid; to have their interests supported in international trade negotiations; to see their sales facilitated by a President or Prime Minster transformed into a commercial traveller. The recent decision by Airbus to set up an assembly site in the USA (in Mobile, Alabama) is emblematic in this respect. It is about limiting the risks of losses linked to variations in the exchange rate of the dollar, and easier access to Pentagon contracts thanks to the jobs created. Also, Alabama is a state where trade union organisation is rendered difficult by local legislation [4]. Yet initially Airbus was a typical case of a European project initiated in 1969 by the French and German governments (after the British withdrawal).
From this viewpoint, the idea of imposing a budgetary straitjacket on the peoples of Europe and the challenge to their social model is rational. A first experience has been had in Germany with the Hartz reforms mentioned above which have strongly improved industrial competitiveness at the price of significant social costs and increased inequality.

As Lapavitsas says, this scenario could well lead to a break-up of the Euro zone, even if the German bourgeoisie profits from its existence. If we make an analogy with the USA, at the end of the Second World War, the latter spent significant sums (through the Marshall Plan) building an international architecture which politically, militarily and economically suited them. One could imagine the bourgeoisie and the German state making a similar choice in Europe. That would suppose a little less austerity and more flexible rules for the functioning of the ECB and more so-called “stability” funds. That would limit, but not suppress (for the structural reasons given by Michel Husson), the risks of a redrawing or a break-up of the zone.

No European New Deal
The configuration of this possible rupture of the Euro zone would depend fundamentally on social resistance in the countries subject to enforced austerity policies. It is impossible to specify the modalities of this and the consequences which could be devastating for the zone as a whole. But for now, in line with the wishes of the dominant sectors of industry and finance, it is the hard line which prevails.

A European progressive “New Deal” which Michel Husson characterises as “cooperative harmonisation” appears to say the least improbable, as he says himself. There is for now no essential sector of the bourgeoisie which supports it and there is no effective pressure from the European labour movement in this direction. Certainly for the first time the European Trade Union Confederation has opposed a European treaty, rejecting the budgetary Treaty, characterised as a “permanent austerity treaty”. After the European summit of June 28-29, 2012, its general secretary Bernadette Ségol said: “The banks will perhaps be saved, but we see nothing which will save wage earners. The pact for growth envisages nothing new”. but there is a gap between such statements, more radical than in the past, and the preparation of movements of European employees as a whole. Movements which would go beyond days of action or demonstration tending to substitute for strikes and faced with which the governments are not ready to make the slightest concession (as has been shown in Spain and Portugal).

Thus to the great chagrin of those who see it as the sole rational solution, there will be no New Deal at the European level, without unexpected developments. And the radical opponents of neo-liberalism and capitalism are too weak and too uncoordinated at the European level to press radical solutions. The global justice movement is no longer capable of demonstrations like that in Genoa in 2001 which brought together youth and workers (and was subject to strong police repression). The movement of the indignant has for the moment serious difficulties in accumulating enough forces to regain the offensive.

Towards national crises?
There remains then the hypothesis of “big national crises” which lead, in some states, to a situation where those who rule can no longer govern as before and those they rule can no longer bear being oppressed as before. Among the European bourgeoisies there will be winners and losers from austerity policies and globalisation: the winners in the most internationalised sectors, the losers, for example, in the small and medium enterprises, some liberal professions and the state or regional bureaucracies. The challenge to social gains, the dismantling of the right to work, will weigh on all. Greece gives of a foretaste of what such a crisis could look like.

In such a situation several camps would face each other, as in Greece today: those ready to continue to play the card of austerity in the context of the EU, nationalists and anti-capitalists (with of course at the political level many intermediary nuances). The anti-capitalists should be in a position to exert weight and rally a social and political front, both through their radicalism and their ability to provide a solution in terms of political power and the management of society. For Europe, they should make themselves the bearers, as Michel Husson puts it, of “a unilateral rupture with the actually existing Europe in the name of another project for Europe”. That would suppose unilateral measures, in contradiction with the European treaties, both to improve living conditions and set up the bases of a social and ecological development, but simultaneously with the will to aid mobilisation in other countries, broadening the process begun in one state. All this without falling to quote Trotsky’s “Programme for Peace” again, into social patriotism: “it must not be forgotten that in social patriotism there is active, besides the most vulgar reformism, a national revolutionary messianism, which regards its national state as chosen for introducing to humanity “socialism” or “democracy,” be it on the ground of its industrial or of its democratic form and revolutionary conquests”. Because it is certainly another kind of Europe that needs to be built.

* Henri Wilno is a member of the Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (NPA, France) and the Fourth International.
NOTES
[1] Which can be found on the site of the South African magazine Amandla!”: http://www.amandlapublis...
[2] 6. Leon Trotsky, “The Program for Peace” http://www.marxists.org/archive/tro...
[3] “Interview: Working people have no interest in saving the euro” http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id...
[4] “I think it’s extremely unfortunate that a company that has been as successful as Airbus with a fully unionized workforce is choosing to go to a ’right-to-work’ state to build that plant. It doesn’t make sense”, said Paul Shearon, Secretary-Treasurer of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers [[ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012...

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Front National: Predictable progress, a danger to fight

Yvan Lemaître
May 2012
International Viewpoint

In number of votes, the far right is growing. It is one of the dangers of the time. To counter it, moral pieties are not enough, when the concrete policy of the left in power is to put itself at the service of the power of money and capital. That is why we need an anti-capitalist party, and a workers’ movement capable of opposing austerity wherever it comes from.

Marine le Pen did not make it to the second round, but she won 6.4 million votes and 17.90 % of the poll. This has a significant impact on the relationship of political forces emerging from April 22 and May 6, and will weigh on the subsequent parliamentary elections.

In 2002, Le Pen and Megret scored 19.20 % or 5.48 million votes, while the CPNT (the “hunters and fishers party”), a part of whose electorate is close to the far right, scored 4.23%. Marine Le Pen thus lost 1.3% but with a higher rate of participation she gained 900,000 votes.

Behind the figures, there are notable developments. The FN vote fell sharply in the big cities and the working class suburbs, where it was often behind the Front de gauche. It fell by more than 5% in Lyon, Toulouse, Montpellier and Nice, and 4% in Lille, Paris and Marseille. In ten big cities out of fifteen, the FdG beat the FN. In five city suburbs in the most deprived neighbourhoods (Grigny, Vaulx-en-Velin, Saint-Denis, la Courneuve and Aubervilliers), the far right went from 20.63% in 2002 to 11.88 %. The FN did not really progress in its eastern bastions stretching from the Gard to the Moselle, on the contrary it went from 10 to 15% in the rural departments of the west (Dordogne, Cantal, Landes, Charente and so on).

Sarkozy lost 1.69 million votes in relation to 2007, while benefiting from some of the 3.5 million voters lost by Bayrou. Le Pen’s gains came mainly from this electorate of the right. Her strategy, seeking to break the ostracism to which her party has been subjected, worked. And this at a time when the defeat of Sarkozy and his politics of flattering far right prejudices while playing footsy with Bayrou has left the right weakened and divided.

Left capitulation, right demagogy

The political mechanisms which have led to this situation emerge from the capitulation and impotence of the left as well as the populist demagogy of the right, amplified by the pressures of the crisis. These are the essential components of a latent political crisis, which rapidly wears out the ruling teams, sharpens the contradictions between deeds and words, and strips bare the lies of the politicians, resented as so many contemptuous aggressions by the workers and the popular classes.

This logic was established in the first presidential term of François Mitterrand, when the right and the left cohabited in the management of affairs. It continued before the crisis came to put left and right policies back to back, both subjecting, through Europe, the interests of the people to the defence of the interests of the financial and industrial groups. The demoralisation of the world of work, struck full on by flexibility, unemployment, the degradation of living and working conditions, generalised social insecurity, has created the terrain on which reactionary prejudices have blossomed. All the more so in that the right tries to maintain its influence over a part of its electorate by playing the same sinister demagogic music, thus aiding the FN.

The left has remained incapable of reacting or offering a perspective, because it is subject to the established order, to the will of the powerful. Its victory does not reverse this evolution because it results from the rejection of Sarkozy, not from a politics rallying the popular classes in a perspective of challenging the dictatorship of finance. It left the field free to Marine Le Pen and her politics which divert social discontent onto the terrain of nationalism, chauvinism and racism.

That said, given the evolution of the FN’s results, the left dynamic expressed above all around the Front de gauche, but also witnessed in the campaigns of Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud, illustrates the instability of the situation and what is at stake in the coming social and political struggles. Nothing is settled. Certainly, the political developments these elections bear witness to are also taking place in numerous other European countries, with the emergence of far right populist parties or even genuinely fascist formations, using physical violence against the workers’ movement. But there is nothing automatic about this. What happens depends on the capacity of the workers’ movement, both trade union and political wings, to retake the initiative by affirming itself as a force of opposition to austerity policies, including those of the left.

“La chef de l’opposition, c’est moi”

Marine Le Pen wants to create a new party of which she will be the axis, a party of the far right, nationalist and chauvinist, anti-immigrant, hostile to Europe and relying on its collapse, bringing together the FN and a part of the UMP. On May 1 she evoked the beginning of a “historic combat” for “the great party of national coming together”. The next stage will be the parliamentary elections in June, during which she wants to see “a massive entry into the national assembly of the ‘Rassemblement bleu marine’.”

On April 22 the FN scored more than 12.5% of those registered to vote – the threshold for going through to the second round of the parliamentary elections – in 353 circumscriptions out of 577. Even if its vote falls, it has a great nuisance capacity for the UMP. Obtaining deputies is another affair. However, the situation created after the presidential election constitutes a serious warning. It is clear that the influence of the far right, its ability to find a place in the institutional game and in the life of the county, represents a terrible danger for workers. It reflects a degradation of the relationship of forces in favour of the dominant classes.

A necessary counter-offensive

These elections constitute a warning; The left in power will bend to the needs of the markets, and the banks. François Hollande has undertaken to honour the illegitimate and unjust debt. His “humanist” speeches, like those on equality and justice, will in no way prevent him from defending national identity and counter-posing it to immigration.

In this social and political battle which is opening, what matters is not to abandon the terrain to the far right, but to build against it, but also against the neoliberal government , a left opposition force; a force which fights for the world of labour and of youth, to defend their rights, to fight for solidarity among all the exploited whatever their origin in the daily life of the neighbourhoods and workplaces, to combat racism; a force which situates its combat at the level of all Europe, against all nationalist and chauvinist reflexes. The task is to unite the world of labour and its organisations against any policy of austerity, to put an end to the dictatorship of the financial and industrial groups.

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Yvan Lemaître is a member of the NPA Executive Committee. He was formerly a member of the LCR leadership.

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Front de gauche: and now?

François Sabado
May 2012
International Viewpoint

One of the striking events of the 2012 French presidential election was the campaign of the Front de Gauche (FdG) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon: tens of thousands of participants at its meetings, a significant place in the political debate and 11.01% of the vote in the first round, a notable score.

Certainly the FdG leaders had hoped for a result of more than 15% and above all third place ahead of Front National (FN) leader Marine Le Pen. But going from the 5% which had been predicted for them in the polls at the beginning of the campaign to 11%, they have succeed in dominating the space of the “radical left” and marginalising the revolutionary left.

A real dynamic

During this campaign a left reformist political force of mass influence has been reconstructed. This is the result of several factors:  

• A situation, marked by social defeats, which favours the aspiration and the illusion that “what is blocked by struggle can be unblocked by the election”.  
• The remobilisation of the forces of the Communist parties (also seen in Portugal, Spain and Greece), resting on the fact that they have not been in government for some years and that they have preserved positions in the apparatuses of the institutions or trade union organisations.  
• A good campaign by Mélenchon. Defending radical objectives, such as a minimum wage of 1,700 euros or the defence of public services, his speeches invoked the revolutionary imagination of the texts of Victor Hugo and the most glorious moments of the workers’ movement. This alchemy unleashed a political dynamic beyond the parties of the Front de gauche. A campaign which was all the more noteworthy in that it came as a counterpoint to that of François Hollande which was especially dull (to put it mildly).

Ambiguities and contradictions

Mélenchon’s impressive campaign was however heavy with ambiguities and contradictions which justified the NPA’s independent campaign. The NPA and the FdG shared common positions on such themes as social issues (wages, employment, defence of public services) or democratic demands (proportional representation or defence of the rights of immigrants). The two organisations are united in their opposition to the FN. On the other hand, other issues divide them sharply: on nuclear energy, there is a major disagreement between the NPA and the PCF leadership, attached by numerous links to the French nuclear industry.

We share then overall common objectives, and the dynamic around the Front de gauche campaign opens new political possibilities, for their realisation. However, in terms of engaging in a serious struggle and obtaining the implementation of our demands, the PCF and Jean -Luc Mélenchon reject confrontation with the power of the capitalists. They denounce finance, not capitalist ownership. They demand a public banking sector but reject the expropriation of the banks and their nationalisation under social control, preferring to see the private and public banking sectors compete. They denounce the scandal of the debt but reject its cancellation. Mélenchon proposes a repayment of the debt over several years, balancing off the sacrifices between the capitalists and the masses. Here again, it is necessary to be consistent. If we participate in a campaign for a citizen’s audit, it is to prepare the ground for the cancellation of the debt, and not its progressive repayment. The leader of the FdG evokes “ecological planning” without indicating the strategic resources necessary to this planning, in particular, the socialisation of the key sectors of the economy, transport, and energy.

On the political and historic level, the reformist orientation of the leadership of the FdG goes hand in hand with the “republican” positions of Mélenchon. Not those of the Communards, who opposed the social republic to the bourgeois classes, but those of republicans who in their defence of the republic merge the terms “nation”, “republic” and “state”. This conception subordinates the “citizen’s revolution” or “revolution by the ballot box” to respect for the institutions of the state of the dominant classes. Mélenchon freely evokes US imperialism, but not French imperialism. During the presidential campaign he reaffirmed “that in the current situation, the nuclear deterrent remains the key element of our strategy of protection”.

Far from being questions of detail, these conceptions are key elements in Mélenchon’s politics – he will do all he can to channel, subordinate, and render compatible the mass movements and the institutions of the republic. These questions also become decisive in discussing strategy and party or political movement.

What policy towards the Front de gauche?

In relating politically to the FdG, we need to take into account these elements: the dynamic, but also the project; the mobilisation, but also the overall political programme; the renewal of activism but also the policies of the leadership.

Tens of thousands of activists and hundreds of thousands of voters have given a radical, social, democratic content to their vote or participation in the initiatives of the FdG. For them, it is about rejecting the austerity of the right but also the austerity of the left by mobilising together around vital demands like the 1,700 euros, a ban on layoffs, the defence of public services, a regular status for precarious workers in the public sector, the defence of undocumented persons. For our part, we believe it is necessary to go much further than punctual unity of action. Faced with the austerity that a Hollande government prepares for us, we offer the Front de gauche, as well as the others (LO or the alternatives) the construction of a unitary opposition to the government. The NPA is ready for it. And the FdG? This battle is decisive so as not to allow the FN to take up the banner of the opposition. It is this which must lead us to dialogue, in common action, with the activists and sympathisers of the FdG.

At the same time it should not be forgotten that the FdG is a political construction, led by the PCF and Mélenchon and not a simple united front. This is not a party, is already a political movement. That means all is not decided, questions remain open. It seems at this stage that the leaders of the FdG do not wish to participate in the government. Targeting “the taking of power, all power, within ten years”, Mélenchon rules out participation in a government that he does not lead. The constraints of the crisis are such that the PCF seem to choose a formula of "support without participation", already used in the past. Tensions could surge between the leadership of the PCF and Mélenchon. Pierre Laurent, national secretary of the PCF, sets as the objective at the parliamentary elections “the election of a left majority in the National Assembly, with the maximum of Front de gauche deputies”. A left majority with the PS? What would the FdG deputies do when the budget of the Hollande government was voted on? What the regional counsellors of the FdG have already done in nearly all regions, aligning with the PS? These questions remain open. To allow common action, an appropriate tactical policy is needed on our part.

None of the hypotheses envisaged by the FdG at this stage challenge its reformist project. Thus, at a time when calls are made to join the FdG, including from inside the NPA, we think on the contrary that the organisation of anti-capitalists cannot depend on the tactical evolution of the FdG. To join the Front de gauche is to accept the leadership of the PCF and Mélenchon. To have weight on the political scene, stimulate unitary action and keep all the possibilities of criticism demands an NPA independent of the FdG. The independent organisation of anti-capitalists is not a tactical choice. It is a strategic option which maintains the historic continuity of the revolutionary current. A dual challenge is now posed to the NPA: to resume its construction and set out a unitary policy, in particular in relation to the FdG.

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François Sabado is a member of the Executive Bureau of the Fourth International and an activist in the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) in France. He was a long-time member of the National Leadership of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR).

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France: Jean-Luc Melenchon and the Left Front, a dynamic, but to where?

With the second round of French presidential elections occurring and much of the discussion of the elections by the Anglophone left focusing on the performance of Jean-Luc Melenchon and the Front de Gauche I thought it would be helpful to air the views of the French far-left most particularly the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste. Below is a rough translation of an article that appearred in the the NPA's Tout est à nous! in April in the wake of the first round of the presidential elections. I will be posting a translation of an article on the NPA's election campaign soon.

Jean-Luc Melenchon and the Left Front, a dynamic, but to where?
Manu Bichindaritz
Tout est à nous!
26 April 2012

With 11.11% of the votes, the candidate of the Front de Gauche registered a clearly improved result compared to the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) results in previous presidential elections. It contributes to embodying the will for real change. However, the contradictions of the work of political regroupment have not disappeared and could even increase after a mixed result achieved by the militants of the FG.

Jean-Luc Melenchon final ballot result was below the result that had been predicted in polls for several weeks, between 12 to 15%. Moreover, the Left Front has failed to "put behind him" the far-right candidate, as its representatives had raised in the last weeks of campaigning. Yet the score is far from being a failure. Mélenchon surpassed by a factor of six the result achieved by Marie-George Buffet, the PCF candidate, in 2007. He managed to gather about his candidacy a large proportion of the votes of the radical left to occupy the space to the left of the Parti Socialiste (PS).  

With our bid and that of Nathalie Arthaud for Lutte Ouvrière (LO), this space results in 13, 23%. Roughly the same level as in 2002 but almost four points higher than in 2007. There is a little push to the left of the PS, but also a political shift towards anti-liberal forces of the FG. 

You can see clearly from the dynamics that they were able to embody the left of the PS, thus expressing a real distrust [in the politics of the PS ]if not a distrust of the socialist candidate. But we must also appreciate the programmatic limits, even in retrospect, of this transfer of votes from the extreme left to the PCF and the Parti de Gauche. Beyond an often radical discourse, Mélenchon was located in a permanent ambiguity with respect to institutions. In particular, references to the nation or the sovereignty of the Republic, its rejection of any denunciation of French imperialism have accompanied its advancement of proposals such as measures like increasing the after tax minimum wage to 1,700 euros. 

The Left Front has worked during the campaign to avoid the thorny question of the relationship with the Socialist Party, especially in view of a return of it to power. On this issue, the campaign needs to be judged both on the statements of the candidate "I will not go into a government that I don't chair myself ..." and the more direct statements of the PCF leadership, including most recently by Pierre Laurent, PCF National Secretary, setting the objective to mobilize the Left Front for legislative elections "to elect a leftist majority in the National Assembly, with the maximum of deputies of the Left Front." 

One thing is certain: more or less clearly stated, the candidate Mélenchon and various spokespersons, at the end of the presidential election campaign the Left Front is not positioned, in the way they wanted,  to have ministers in a future government. They had sought to force Francois Hollande to the left under the pressure of a high score of Mélenchon, and in the near future for a possible parliamentary majority including all or part of the FG. 

It is now quite possible that the lower election result,  the leaders and activists of the Left Front would have liked at least around 15%, will reopen the debate about the direction and strategy of political regroupment, particularly in relation to the Socialist Party and institutions. The NPA’s call to the FG, as to LO and all of the social left is that is time to build a united response to the austerity and prepare a left opposition to Hollande. Is the FG ready?

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France: Thousands rally in support of Mélenchon and Front de Gauche

Lisbeth Latham

On March 18 more than 120,000 people joined in the rally for a Sixth republic called by the Front de Gauche (FdG) in support of its presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The rally was held in the Place de la Bastille and marked the 141st anniversary of the Paris Commune.



The FdG is an electoral alliance that draws together the majority of the parties to the left of the Parti Socialiste (PS), whose candidate Francois Hallande is expected to win the presidence.

Leading into the March 18 protest, Mélenchon had been polling at 11%, however in the immediate wake he polled as high as 13%. Both massive election rally and high polls demonstrates that the FdG has established significant momentum that it may be able to carry into the National Assembly elections in June and increase the Front's representation.



The Nouveau Parti Anticapaliste (NPA), which is standing it's own presidential candidate Philippe Poutou, has argued that the growing success of Mélenchon will increasingly open up contradictions both within Mélenchon position and between the organisations that make up the FdG.

Mélenchon has repeatedly called for "citizen's revolutions" which he sees as being achieved through the elections. While such a call could be seen as an aspirational hope of winning government outright, it is important to note that Mélenchon has endorsed the course pursued by Die Linke in Germany, which has entered government with the social democrats at the local level. There is also strong expectation that Parti Communiste Francais, which is by far the largest component of the FdG, and hold more than 90% of the FdG's current seats in the National Assembly, will push to enter government with the PS should it win government. When the PCF entered PS governments in the early 1980s and between 1997 and 2002, the PCF ministers participated in significant liberalisation of the French economy.

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France: NPA Confirm Presidential Candidate

Lisbeth Latham

The Neaveau Parti Anticatiliste (NPA) announced March 13 that they had completed the final administrative step in nominating Philippe Poutou for the April 22 Presidential election. Poutou is a Confédération générale du travail (CGT) militant at Ford’s Bordeaux plant.

Under France’s undemocratic electoral system presidential candidates require the endorsement of 500 of a list of 45, 000 elected officials, the majority of which are municipal mayors. Presidential nomination is a simple process for larger parties as they can rely on the endorsement from their own members. For smaller parties the process requires that they convince officials from the larger parties to endorse their candidate, which means it is possible for the larger parties to actively exclude smaller parties from the elections and rob people of the opportunity to vote for their preferred candidate.

This is precisely what has occurred to the NPA and other parties to the left of the Parti Socialiste (PS), with the PS leadership sending a letter to its elected officials directing them to not endorse the presidential candidates of other parties. Despite this obstacle, after more than eight months work of talking to elected officials across France, NPA activists were able to obtain endorsement from 520 officials.

The official nomination will help to secure a greater public profile for Poutou’s candidacy. It remains to this increased exposure enable Poutou to lift his current support of 0.5-1% in opinion polls.

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The NPA and French Politics

Below is the contribution I have submitted as part of thediscussion of Dick Nichol's presentation to the 2012 Socialist Alliance Conference that has been published by Links. I should have a longer piece finished in a few days.

Lisbeth Latham

I’ve been meaning to comment on this thread for a while, but have not had a chance as I have been busy writing an article that deals with issues but over a longer time frame than either Dick’s report or Jason Stanley’s articles go into. While the most significant point of discussion is the question of the NPA’s orientation to the Left Front (FG), I also want to touch on the question of the “Veil” and it’s impact on the NPA as I think the question of the “veil” has been a factor that has undermined the ability of the NPA’s membership to be united in action.

Inside or outside the left front
I agree with Nathan that Dick’s contributions over simplify the question of what attitude the NPA should have taken towards the FG. While on one level the question of the NPA’s participation in the FG has been posed several times and the balances of forces and other social factors such as the state of the class struggle in France has changed over this time period. Which factors that needed to be considered over this time period.

I agree with Nathan regarding the NPA also being concerned regarding the participation of the PCF in the 1997-2002 PS government, and at the municipal level. It is also important to note that PS municipal government’s invoked the new essential services laws to end strikes by municipal workers during the 2010 campaign in defence of pensions. By May 2011 the PS had already dropped some of its promises to repeal the changes to the pension laws pushed through by the Fillon government.

The dispute over relationship to the FG at the NPA’s founding congress was on the question of whether to link up with the FG prior to any discussion with the Front regarding relationship with the PS (which was the position of approximately 15% of the delegates – with some 3.5% of the membership departing to form Gauche Unitaire). Or alternatively to enter into a discussion with the Front make a decision as to whether to join based on this. While I agree with Nathan’s is correct to point out that in the European elections the question of government was not posed, I think there were some other factors at play in the NPA majority’s thinking. First the LCR and subsequently had cohered a base of support over the period between the 2002 elections and 2009 based on independence of social liberal left – at the time of the decision the NPA was polling around 10%. Secondly there was probably a concern that once they entered the Front without agreement on independence it would be difficult to exit later on when government was posed – a point I will return to later.

In assessing the European Election results I think there are a number of things to take into account. The NPA substantially improved on the performance of the LCR/LO ticket in 2004– almost doubling the vote - and was higher than Olivier Besancenot’s percentage in the 2007 presidential elections. This compared favourably with the FG only improved on the PCF’s vote by around 0.5%. However the NPA’s result was not as high as they had hoped for and the NPA unlike the FG fell short of the threshold to elect MEPs. At the time Francois Sabato argued that the lower than expected result reflected the down swing in the mass movement against the austerity between the NPA’s founding and the European elections, linked to this would have been the high rate of abstentionism amongst young voters where the NPA had a much higher level of support.

In the 2010 regional elections the NPA was able to negotiate electoral coalitions with the Left Party (PG). These were generally in areas where the PCF ran joint tickets with the PS rather than with the FG. These joint NPA/PG tickets performed as well or better than the FG tickets did.

The 2011 Congress debate occurred within the context of the NPA’s electoral fortunes not being as strong as had been hoped, but also following a significant defeat of the anti-pensions movement. By the tail end of that movement, the more conservative union confederations, the PCF and the PS made it clear that the only way to save people’s pensions was through parliament. The more radical unions were unable to get agreement in the Intersyndicale to continue mobilisations once the laws were passed – which isolated and ended the defiance of more militant sectors of the movement such as the oil workers. In this situation the debate was essentially between three positions regarding the best way forward to build the party – whether it lay with entry in the FG (a little over a quarter of the delegates); an attempt to continue to build a consistent anti-capitalist electoral pole (the largest minority with a little over 40% of delegates) and third position (again around a quarter of delegates) that argued for a greater orientation to the social movements. There was also a fourth tiny platform that argued to embed the party in the proletariat.

By the time the July conference occurred the situation had changed – the attempt to construct broader support around the NPA’s candidate had been unsuccessful. The new balance of forces within the NPA a round three positions. A new narrow majority (50.4%) position that made it clear that their would be an NPA presidential campaign rather than continue at that point to regroup anti-capitalist forces around that position. A large minority (40% of delegates) advocating a greater attempt to engage with the FG that also argued that the majority was retreating from the NPA’s original project and was articulating a sectarian position. Finally there was a small platform (5.8% of delegates) which argued that the NPA majority perspective was not revolutionary enough.

The larger minority grouping has now constituted itself as an organisation, Gauche anticapitaliste, that is functioning both inside and outside the NPA. GA is attempting to rally anticapitalist activists to save the NPA project and is pushing for the NPA to participate in the FG to engage with both PG and PCF members who oppose entering into a PS government.

The GA has called on the NPA to abandon their presidential campaign based on its low poll results and arguing the NPA is simply contesting with LO for 1-2% support in the elections. The GA argue that the NPA’s campaign is becoming indistinguishable from that of LO. The GA has called for the NPA’s March national leadership meeting to discuss and adopt the GA’s perspective.

In response to the emergence of the GA, the NPA majority is attempting to accommodate the GA. IT is looking to both pursuing its own election campaign in both Presidential and National Assembly elections, and at the same time saying that the GA can pursue the possibility of alliances with the FG for the National Assembly elections where agreement can be reached. As part of this the majority is exploring what resources can be made available to support any joint campaigns.

Its unclear where this discussion will go. It’s also difficult to know exactly what the prospects are like inside the FG compared to an electoral campaign outside. It is however possible to make a couple of observations about the character of the positions. I think that there is a real danger that the NPA majority is developing a position that not only is a sell out by the FG leadership, and particularly the PCF, inevitable, but that the crisis experienced by the USFI sections inside both the PRC in Italy and the PT in Brazil is also inevitable. As a consequence they seem to be avoiding question of the possible gains that could be made by leading fight inside the FG for a principled position in the wake of the National Assembly elections. It’s also difficult to get a read on exactly how the GA is relating FG and the extent they are turning engagement with the FG into a principle and thus making the NPA majority’s concerns justified.

Finally on the question of the NPA’s tactical orientation, I want to address what I see as fundamentally problematic with Dick’s analysis, that is attempting to judge what is the question of what os correct orientation for the NPA to adopt based solely on the prospects on the electoral front. Particularly the extent to which the NPA or the left in general will hold up following 2007 elections. It may be the case that due to the shifting state of the social movements unlike 2007 the NPA is not going to the elections having had its presidential candidate play a key role in a successful national campaign (i.e. Olivier Besancenot’s role in the “no” campaign on the European constitution). It may be possible that the NPA’s capacity to effectively build support in the social movements may be better in the long term outside of the FG, but that’s something you can’t get a clear view of outside of direct intimate experience of the French situation. I think it is significant that NPA has been able to successfully build joint mobilisations with both the Solidaires and the FSU education union around solidarity with the Greek movement against austerity.

On the “veil”
While I agree with Nathan in pointing out that the PG has taken a pretty hardline stance on around the “veil”, most of the French left have pretty awful positions based both on supposed advocacy of women’s rights and defence of laïcité. I mean this so as not to excuse the problems with the NPA but to give context to those who are not aware. In response to Ilham Moussaid candidacy for the NPA, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, “You can’t call yourself a feminist while showing off a sign of submission to the patriarchy.” Others examples include:

• In the vote the National Assembly around the law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools, only 36 deputies voted against the law; 
• In 2004, Arlette Laguiller the long term spokesperson of LO, marched alongside Nicole Guedj, a secretary of state in the justice ministry, in a march against the Hijab;
• In the vote to ban the Burqa, the PG’s two senators voted in favour of the ban, with Agnes Marie La Barre, explaining in an article on the Party’s website on September 16 that “nobody is fooled by the xenophobic context in which the law is passed. However our senators felt that the struggle for women’s rights requires the passing of the law”.

I think that the NPA have been affected by this issue more than other forces on the French. This effect was due to a number of reasons. I was the NPA that had the mass media controversy in response to having a “veiled candidate”. It is also important to remember that the LCR had a history of attempting to engage with marginalised émigré communities many of whom come from Muslim backgrounds. This is reflected in the work of LCR/NPA militants such as Catherine Samary in fighting against the law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols and working for the inclusion of women who wear the hijab into feminist mobilisations and the LCR’s public defence and solidarity with youth who rioted across France following the deaths of two boys fleeing police on October 27.

This work meant that that the LCR and subsequently the NPA were able recruit and build networks in these communities. The debate in the NPA, which was sparked by Ilham’s candidacy, undoubtedly damaged this work – I can’t see how having a public debate about whether believers are welcome in the party could not damage this work irrespective that the outcome was that yes they can be members. In my opinion this component of the debate meant that it was not possible for the NPA to put having at least of the debate the 2011 Congress. Another major impact was that it divided the party, and while it’s true that the divisions did not correspond to the divisions around the NPA’s electoral and movement perspectives, this division impacted the ability to intervene around other issues. An example of this was the Law banning women from wearing the Burqa and Niqab in public, where the NPA only endorsed a mobilisation against the ban the night prior to the protest. Another important element of divisive character of the debate is that it raised questions of individuals’ feminist credentials based on how they choose to express their religion, and implications this has for the rights of women to control their own bodies.

While only a small number of individuals who obviously left the NPA over the issue of Ilham’s candidacy. This included Ilham and a group of militants around her, and a group angered by Ilham’s candidacy, some of which like Fabien Engelmann joined National Front over the issue. It undoubtedly had a negative impact on the NPA’s internal unity.

Finally I think that the situation that has confronted the NPA has been extremely complex, and has occurred within a political situation that has become more difficult for political action outside the electoral sphere – which is a major factor that differentiates the NPA from both the PCF and the PG. While I think we should be attempting to learn from the NPA experience I think it is problematic for us to suggest that there are simple answers to the challenges faced by the NPA.

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