One of the hypotheses developed in this article is that the
NPA is not born yet. But this does not mean that nothing has been done. Our
experience has put us in a better position to understand the challenges we
haven’t been able to meet. And this experience has also helped to change the
situation in which we must now operate. To paraphrase Daniel Bensaïd: because
we have tried, we have earned the right to start again.
We are the failure
The temptation is always great to make our responsibilities
seem less important because of external reasons, be they the period we’re in,
or the creation of the Front de Gauche (FdG),1 [1] which has occupied part of
our “space”.
These bad explanations must be cast aside.
The times we live in have seen no less than the start of a
systemic crisis of capitalism, quantitatively the largest social revolt in
France since 1968 (the movement for pensions), the Arab revolutions, the
Indignados movement in Spain and Greece, the Occupy movement in the United
States. How can you make such a period the reason for the failure2 [2] of an
anti-capitalist party? The opposite is true: the inability of the NPA to show
its usefulness in this period of crisis of the system and of mass revolts was
the reason for its internal crisis. Movement setbacks and the progress of
reactionary forces—first and foremost the fascists—do not invalidate this
analysis, even though they can help change the situation in which we operate.
In times of deep crisis for the system, the subjective element is crucial. The
same conditions can benefit one side or the other, depending on their ability
to take the initiative, to build appropriate responses…or depending on the
paralysis of the opposite forces.
The months and years ahead will be explosive. This makes it
all the more important to draw correct balance sheets.
Another “bad” explanation: the Parti de Gauche (PG) and the
Front de Gauche. Was the space for the NPA suddenly occupied by these new
political realities? It would probably be useful to clarify what is meant by
space.3 [3]In any case, it is not an inert substance to be manipulated. We’re
talking about conscious individuals who we believe will be the actors of their
collective emancipation. The birth of the Parti de Gauche, followed by that of
the FdG came slightly after that of the NPA. Here again the truth is the
reverse: these forces benefited—at least in part—from the weakness of the NPA.
The inability to build a “useful” force for tens of thousands of trade
unionists, activists associations, neighbourhood youth, etc led some of them to
cast their hopes on the FdG, at least for a time.4 [4]
Electoral crystallisations, just like organisational crystallisations
are the non-mechanical product of processes of political polarisation,
radicalisation and experimentation. These are still in progress. The current
failure of the NPA is not the end of the story.
The “new” is not born yet
Be it limitation or opportunity, the merit of the initiative
to found the NPA is that of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), which
remained the only organisation of significant size during the founding process
and has played the role of propulsive force. This wasn’t necessarily an
obstacle to the construction of a new party.5 [5] But it gave a central
responsibility to activists from the LCR to “let go”.
Any structure, any organisation creates its own conservatism
in ideas as well as in practice. This is what gives an organisation the
stability needed to hold out in difficult times and to withstand the pressures
of the dominant ideology. But this conservatism, which always involves dangers,
becomes a real obstacle when the situation changes.
The decision by a majority of the LCR to initiate the
creation of a new party was not necessarily a turn away from its struggles or
from its ideas. But it meant that the LCR as a tool, as it had existed, was no
longer adequate to the tasks of the period.
Unlike the old, the new is, by definition, not written. It
develops, experiments, adapts, builds itself. To be new, to learn to be useful
in a new period, the NPA could only be built through a continuous process, with
initially limited structures, as flexible as possible, leaving plenty of room
for new and emerging debates and all kinds of experiments.
However, the shape and the disagreements at the root of the
current crisis of the NPA are clear: the crisis of the NPA looks just like a
crisis of the LCR. Disagreements bear on issues that had been raging within the
LCR for over a decade (alliances with other left forces and intervention in
elections). All the tendencies which were formed and then separated come from
the LCR: Gauche Unitaire, followed by Convergences et Alternatives and now
Gauche Anticapitaliste (GA). All the tendencies since the birth of the NPA,
built in ways that are inherited from the LCR, were led by former leaders of
the LCR (with one small exception).
This simple observation shows us that the “old” has dominated
the “new” party. The LCR only opened the doors to its house. Generously, no
doubt. We turned the light on, we offered coffee. We even sometimes moved some
furniture around. But it was the LCR’s house, the one the members of the LCR
knew, and they knew how it worked. Others could only be guests. It turned out
that that house was actually not suited to the tasks of the new period.
Underestimating the novelty of the period
1) Just a space to occupy... But why was there resistance to
change on the part of a majority of the LCR? It was not a case of bad faith. A
large majority had voted for the creation of a new party. Many were excited by
the beginning of the process. Why then? Mainly because the reasons given—within
the LCR—for the need to build the NPA did not take into account the radically
new character of the period. As a result, the awareness of the need to let the
new express itself remained superficial. Looking in two directions is not an
effective way of orienting oneself.
In the prevalent analysis of the LCR, the start of the new
era was basically “the collapse of the USSR and of Eastern bloc countries
combined with neoliberal capitalist globalisation”,6 [6] the end of a cycle
started in 1917. The analysis was that the crisis of the Communist parties and
the neoliberal evolution of the social democratic left opened up a space that
had to be “occupied”. But through all this we stayed within the paradigm,
frequently expressed in LCR, of “revolutionaries without a revolution”, that is
to say “without immediate revolutionary perspectives”,7 [7]a strange though
catchy phrase, by the bye.
What mattered mainly in the founding of the new party were
therefore somewhat wider programmatic boundaries designed to attract some of
the orphans of the traditional parties while remaining radical enough to
maintain, for the future, revolutionary perspectives. The idea of
programmatically opening up the LCR a little could only lead, for the majority
of the members of the LCR, to opening up the LCR a little organisationally.
2) ...or a more radical change? In this analysis of the
novelty of the period two elements remained marginal: the systemic crisis of
capitalism and above all the return of mass struggles and of an anti-capitalist
consciousness. The systemic crisis of capitalism means we are talking of a
long-term new period of development of all the contradictions within the
system. These can only be solved through a succession of political crises and
large-scale confrontations.
Why is this important? It is through concrete experiences in
the process of crisis and confrontation that our class (broadly defined) may,
on a mass scale, acquire levels of consciousness and organisation making it
suitable for a revolutionary transformation. And it is in the context of these
experiences that various party political strategies will be tested. To take but
one current example.8 [8] During the first few months after the fall of Mubarak
in Egypt, the few who dared to criticise the army were completely marginalised
on this issue. A year later their position on this point is more widely adopted
and their audience has grown, especially among the youth.
The other factor is the return of mass struggles: the
strikes of the winter of 1995 in France, the mass uprisings in Indonesia and
South Korea, Seattle in 1999 and the emergence of a global movement,
counter-summits and social forums, the global movement against the war in Iraq
(to take examples preceding the launch of the NPA). In this dynamic process a
global critique of the system has resurfaced—the consciousness, at least at an
embryonic stage, that all struggles are linked by an overall logic, that the
fight must be against a whole system. This is expressed in a stronger form
still since the ideological hegemony of the neoliberal model has collapsed with
the crisis. A generation of tens of thousands of activists has been in
formation for the past 15 years or so on the basis of these experiments.
From propaganda to strategy as the heart of the new party
There is therefore not a fixed space needing to be filled.
Rather, radically different possibilities open up in the struggle for another
society. What makes a new party both necessary and possible is the conjunction
of a period which can set in motion millions of people with the emergence of
tens of thousands of activists within various fronts of the movement, who are
their practical leaders on a day to day basis.
Without them the hundreds of workplace confrontations each
year would be impossible, as would be the more generalised movements, strikes
and mass demonstrations (for pensions, against Jacques Chirac’s attempt to take
back the rights of young workers, against the war…). Without them the heroic struggle
of the undocumented, the mobilisation around Palestine, the struggle against
nuclear power or local struggles such as those conducted against the airport at
Notre Dame des Landes, the struggles in poor neighbourhoods, etc could not be
maintained. This is the basis for the aim of a force that brings together and
coordinates them, making it possible to develop a global strategy for the
movement to victories and to give a perspective of collective liberation.
Revolutionary activists should, of course, play a role in
this process. But this requires, on their part, a “cultural” revolution in
order to be up to the task. They must break with ways of thinking and operating
cultivated over decades of marginalisation of the extreme left, of being
“revolutionaries without a revolution”. We must move from “the weapon of
criticism” to the “criticism of weapons” and not underestimate the radical
change this leads to, in practice as in theory.9 [9] We must stop confining
ourselves to propagandism, to the cult of the “correct” programme, to the
“general strike” mantra and to criticising traditional leaderships of the
working class movement as the only possible orientation.
We have failed to make this cultural revolution: moving from
propaganda from outside the movement to elaborating a strategy from within the
movement. This requires not only an awareness of the issues but also leaning on
the thousands of activists in the movement in order to begin to create a new
revolutionary culture, gradually developing on the basis of our shared
experiences and on the achievements of the revolutionary tradition. It requires
a strategy capable of bringing along the whole movement, which would pose anew
the major debates and reformulate the project for emancipation.
The party remained external to the concerns of activists
1) A party for struggles ... or for elections? Despite what
was announced, the NPA was never conceived as a party for struggle, a party of
the movement. Following on from Olivier Besancenot’s performance at the polls,
it has worked primarily as an electoral outlet. Let us remember that the
foundation of the NPA was rushed in order to present candidates for the
European elections, as the first nationwide public action for the new party.
There followed many debates and incessant (and unresolved!)
strife on electoral tactics while resources were invested primarily in national
election campaigns, but few discussions on union work, building an anti-racist
movement, a movement against debt, the defence of public services, concrete
solidarity with the Arab revolutions. How many debates and exchanges of
experiences on the development of struggles in local areas? How much was put
into the building, by the whole party, of the Copenhagen, Strasbourg or
Frankfurt counter-summits, the march of the undocumented, the collectives
against debt, etc? Not to mention topics such as police brutality or the Front
National, or new ways of mobilising and organising.
2) Politics outside the movement: This orientation is rooted
in a theory of the autonomy of social movements not challenged and not
discussed at the foundation of the NPA. In the new period this theory has
become the theory of the depoliticisation of the movement.
With the downturn in the 1980s, and the predominance of
defensive struggles against neoliberal capitalist restructuring, it was much
more difficult concretely to experience the emancipatory potentialities of the
movement. This opened the way for a division between the field of “social”
struggles and the field of the “political” fight. This separation was
sanctioned by the appearance of the phrase “social movement”, as an umbrella
term for struggles and groupings, as opposed to the political field defined narrowly
as the confrontation between parties, mainly on the electoral terrain.
This affected the LCR, which defended “the autonomy of
social movements”. To understand how such a conception could develop, it should
be added that it was nurtured and encouraged by a fundamentally sound critique
of the tradition developed by the traditional parties (first and foremost the
Communist Party) of using the trade union movement or other groupings for their
own benefit—meaning that these organisations instead of being actors of
emancipation became tools for party strategies.
In the name of this conception, LCR activists increasingly
intervened in movements as individuals. Sometimes they played a key role and
brought with them their general conceptions. But there was less discussion of
strategy within the party, and less collective testing. Gradually the
consequences became profound for the functioning of the party itself: a
separation arose between those most involved in the movement and those working
within the party. The leadership became less subject to the pressure of the
movement, the questions it raises and the need for strategic development it
imposes. Conversely it reinforced the “pragmatic” bent for activists becoming
heavily involved in specific, mainly defensive movements.
Last but not least: with the decrease in discussions on the
issues raised by the movement, the party’s intervention became dominated by
programmatic delimitations with other parties. This led to an increasingly
central place being given to elections.
3) Politics in the movement: The NPA was born out of the
development of mass movements, yet this conception has in fact continued to
dominate its orientation and its practice. It does not meet the needs of
movements constantly confronted with the question of the overall logic of the
system, nor does it convince activists, who are brought outside of their place
of intervention.
The autonomy of the movement is a fine thing, but it needs
to be thought through: the movement transforms society, not elected individuals
or political parties. In other words: the revolutionary transformation of
society can only be the work of the majority of the movement of the oppressed
and exploited.
This does not mean autonomy of the movement vis-à-vis
politics but that the movement itself evolves and becomes political. Political
in the sense that it becomes the alternative,10 [10] that it struggles for
power, not aiming to replace those who are at the head of existing institutions
with its own representatives, but in order to replace existing institutions
with its own collective forms of power—and that it starts to build them in
today’s struggles.
This does not mean that the movement must stay away from
political parties but it means they must prove the validity of what they stand
for within the movement itself—it also means they can only prove this through
understanding and respecting the rhythms of the movement and through developing
a useful strategy for the movement.
It follows that a revolutionary strategy is a strategy that
shows how the movement can become political, through all the experiences of the
class struggle on all fronts (including elections)—rather than one which
theorises the separation between the social movement and the political
movement.
It follows that the party cannot invent this strategy from
outside. It should first aim to promote the generalisation of experiences and
dynamics from the movement itself: just look how examples as diverse as the
Indignados, Occupy, the Arab revolutions, workplace occupations, “Can’t pay,
won’t pay” movements pose—at least in embryonic form—the question of another
power, of a real democracy. They also are—more positively—the expression of the
distrust that exists toward institutions as expressed also by low voter turnout,
the rejection of the mainstream media or riots where what is identified with
the “institutions of society” gets broken.
Unmoving conceptions externally imposed
1) “Our response to the crisis”: a strategic discussion
aborted: The dominant conception in the NPA is that the “correct” programme
(and the correct demands) can be brought to the movement from without by the
party. Hence the emphasis on elections as a way to address a mass audience.
Hence the emphasis on programmatic delimitations in order to differentiate
between true anti-capitalists and “treacherous” leaders.
If a programme is necessary it should be a programme that
combines goals and the means of achieving them, a guide to action. It cannot be
a “perfect”, fixed programme, born in the mind of a few revolutionaries; it
must be modified by experiences and developments. The elaboration of such a
programme is therefore inseparable from the development of the movement itself
and of debates on the experiences and issues raised. From this point of view,
probably nothing is more indicative of the failure of the NPA than the text
“Our response to the crisis”, adopted at the first congress in 2009.11 [11]
This text could have opened up a debate on what an
anti-capitalist strategy in a period of deep crisis and mass struggles would
look like. Yet the discussion was confined to the contents of a programme, a
list of demands, which some found not radical enough and others too radical,
everyone being obsessed with what boundaries to establish or not to establish
with the Front de Gauche.
Let’s be clear, the more or less implicit reference for many
comrades in this debate was the transitional programme advocated by Trotsky in
1938.12 [12] We will not discuss here the validity of the reference. What is striking,
however, when we take the transitional programme as it was defended by Trotsky
is that it has an element of an action programme, each demand being combined
with a suitable organisational form: strengthening trade unions and struggling
within them and factory committees for the opening of account ledgers and
workers’ control, pickets and workers’ militia for the arming of the
proletariat, councils grouping factory committees and neighbourhood
organisations on a geographical basis for the workers’ and peasants’
government.
This articulation of demands with specific forms of
organisation of the movement is exactly what is missing in “Our response to the
crisis”. We discussed demands, but it proved impossible to move on to a
discussion on the ways in which these demands could be carried out by the
movement.
2) No need for concrete analysis? The lack of strategic
concern leads to a lack of concern in the analysis of concrete reality. This
has led to the lack of analysis of a long cycle of evolution (and
recomposition) of the capitalist organisation of production, the
destructuration of the traditional working class and the reconstruction of a
new class composition. Yet it is also the reconfiguration of the reality of our
class which has put in crisis the traditional organisations of the labour
movement. Is there a specific revolutionary subject? Should we still think in
terms of strategic productive sectors?
Assuming that we should, are they the same as 20 or 30 years
ago? Should we think in terms of organising struggling workers by occupation,
by trade or by location? Don’t the development of migration and the
feminisation of labour alter the relationship between struggles against
discrimination and struggles in workplaces? Don’t the fragmentation of
production units and contracts, the development of precariousness and the
growth in service jobs lead to a change in the role and in the methods of
struggle in inner-city areas? These discussions—but we could cite others—were
absent in the construction of the NPA, not to mention the changing face of the
state or of imperialism, the role of the media, of social networks.
A new workers’ movement capable of developing strategies and
organisational forms that correspond to the new realities of class composition
must be rebuilt. This should be combined with resistance to restructuring in
the old sectors where the old organisations remain the best established. The
articulation should be put in these terms rather than in the choice between
reconstruction and recomposition.
Is one born a revolutionary, or does one become one?
A party cannot develop a strategy if its members are not
involved in the movement in different ways. This also works in reverse: it is
through discussions necessary for elaboration and through tests made within the
movement that a “new” revolutionary consciousness may be forged among the
collective members of the party, and that previous ideas may be modified,
enriched and criticised.
This requires a break with the idea of a ready-made
revolutionary theory created by the leaders of party tendencies, and with its
mirror image: a misconception of reformism as a simple “mind manipulation”. The
influence of reformism cannot be reduced to the “treacherous” leaders betraying
addled masses to whom the truth must be revealed.
Reformism is the product of a contradictory consciousness
reflecting a contradictory experience. On the one hand the experience of
domination (exploitation and oppression) and competition that promotes feelings
of powerlessness and makes the idea that only elected officials can improve
things seem sensible. On the other hand, the experience of resistance to this
domination, which not only tears individualism apart, and recreates solidarity,
but which also puts in question the power of the boss and the neutrality of the
state.
This means that reformism cannot be fought only in terms of
ideology (with propaganda). The return of mass struggles and the experiences
and failures of those involved in them are the basis for changes in mass
consciousness. But we need to understand this change as a process. There is no
binary switch at an individual or collective level in the evolution of
consciousness from reformism to revolutionary politics.
Fighting against the influence of reformism and developing a
revolutionary consciousness are tied together. They cannot be advanced through
proclamations but through practical demonstrations to promote all experiences
demonstrating practically the collective strength we have and the superiority
of a strategy based on it compared with institutional strategies.
Tinkering is not enough; we must rebuild
1) Still possible...and still necessary: The task of
building is still before us. The audience won by the Front de Gauche has shown
the availability of hundreds of thousands of young people and workers for a
political and radical perspective. The Front de Gauche is caught as in the
straitjacket of a cartel of organisations whose main objective is not
self-organisation and the development of counter-powers—but an institutional
perspective. It therefore cannot be the basis for the force we need to build.
Struggles go on outside these organisations in the youth, in the banlieues,
often in a fragmented manner.
The nature of the times makes the construction of an
anti-capitalist force not just possible; it makes it more necessary than ever.
Without the coordination of movement activists and the progressive development
of an anti-capitalist strategy, victories become increasingly difficult to gain
for specific struggles, as demonstrated by the movement on pensions, the
anti-racist struggle or the anti-war movement.
During the movement over pensions the strategy of union
leaders imposed itself by default. This is because there was not a force
bringing together tens of thousands of radical unionists with the respect of
their workmates in all sectors and regions, arising from the development of
combative local unions or rank and file committees, linked to the majority of
young people in high schools and colleges, able to organise local support. Such
a force could have proposed an alternative strategy to that of the union
leaders through generalising from the best experiences.
In other words, victories, even partial victories, require
that strategies of confrontation with the logic of the system be proposed
widely to the movement and that forms of grassroots organisation and
counter-powers be developed. Such a force is also made necessary by the general
tendency of the capitalist system. Without a perspective of global
transformation and emancipation, reactionary “solutions” will have the upper
hand. Therefore, we must try again.
2) Rebuilding, saying it and doing it: We should not be
ashamed of our failure. We all have the merit of having tried. But failure it
is that has demoralised thousands of activists and developed scepticism more
widely still. We must therefore say publicly that we have failed; it is a
necessary condition if we want to be trusted in our desire to try again. We
also need to say that we do not want to patch up what didn’t work, but that we
are calling for a radical overhaul of the NPA. These conditions are necessary
but not sufficient. We are not asking to be believed on trust. We’ll be judged
by our actions. And this cannot be postponed.
3) Where to start? Proclaiming a different mode of operation
or a different programme will not create a new party. Departures have left the
structures of the party in a fragile state, from local committees to national
structures (commissions, press, national leadership bodies…). We should “take
advantage” of the situation to restart a process of foundation on the basis of
the local committees—national structures can simply, at least for the time
being, “manage” current affairs.
Committees for a real refoundation should be
autonomous—regarding their local involvement, mode of operation, the
organisation of their debates—and coordinated for national campaigns on which
they agree and for debates relating to the rebuilding of the party. These
committees should be completely open to the outside, encouraging the
participation of movement activists, even if they do not join the party. At all
levels we should encourage discussions between activists of other parties of
the radical left.
At least during a transition period, the newspaper could
serve primarily as a liaison organ between the committees: reports of
experiences made by the committees, announcements of protests, meetings,
events, contributions to the debate, etc.
The cornerstone of this process should be involvement in the
movement and the development of our strategy as a basis for an exchange of
experiences and as a basis for discussions, including theoretical debates. From
this point of view, the development of campaigns against austerity and public
debt—related to the refusal of redundancy plans and to international
solidarity—and the fight against the development of racism and the extreme
right should be dominant axes for our activities.
Conclusion
Nothing would be worse than making the forthcoming NPA
congress a sham. The process leading to this congress must be a part of the
wider process of rebuilding: not limited to internal debate but encouraging
open discussion with the outside on all subjects and at all levels, starting
work on our strategy and our functioning without excluding more theoretical
debates (the dynamics of capital/labour, movement/institutions, oppression/exploitation).
This process will be a live one if it takes as a basis
action within the movements, experiments made by the various committees, and if
it does not claim to solve in advance discussions that must remain open.
In this sense the preparation for this congress should be
seen as a refounding process on the basis of contributions going back and forth
between committees rather than platforms made “at the top”, on which party
members should position themselves. The congress itself should be thought of
not as an end (of the process) but as a step on the way: the party itself
should be conceived of as a process-party, an experimental party.
Finally, at this conference the youth must be put back at
the heart of the party, of its committees, of its experiences, of its debates,
and not as something separate, but as central to its activity, and even as a
driving force. This is also a prerequisite for building a party for the future,
a movement party, a new anti-capitalist party.
References
Adam, Hélène,
Daniel Bensaïd, François Coustal, Léon Crémieux, Jacqueline Guillotin, Samuel
Johsua, Alain Krivine, Olivier Martin, Christine Poupin, Pierre Rousset,
François Sabado, Roseline Vachetta, 2009, “De la LCR au NPA”.
Godard, Denis, 2009, “The NPA: a Space for Rebuilding”,
International Socialism 123 (Summer 2009).
Godard, Denis,
2011 “Qu’est-ce qu’on veut : Tout!” Que faire? 8 (second series).
Johsua, Samy,
2006, “Mélanges Stratégiques”, Que faire? 5 (1st series),.
Marx, Karl, 1975, Early Writings (Penguin).
NPA, 2011, “Nos
Réponses à la Crise”.
Sitel, Francis,
2008, “Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, Espoirs et Pièges” in Critique
Communiste, 187 (June).
Trotsky, Leon, 1938, The Death Agony of Capitalism and the
Tasks of the Fourth International.
This English translation was published by International
Socialist Journal in Issue: 137, Posted: 9 January 13.
Footnotes
[1] The Front de Gauche is the coalition formed in 2009
between the French Communist Party and the newly-formed Parti de Gauche, the
latter being in the main a left split from the social democratic Parti
Socialiste. Other smaller groups have also joined the Front de Gauche. This
article was translated by Sylvestre Jaffard. It originally appeared in French
in Que Faire? number 10, August-October 2012.
[2] True, events of such magnitude can unleash internal
crises. Their novelty and their importance should, in any organisation worthy
of the name, spark many discussions in order to analyse them and to develop
responses. It is indeed through this kind of debate and through attempts to
intervene effectively that a new party can be forged. Alas, everyone will agree
that this hasn’t been the NPA’s problem. We are therefore talking here about a
failure.
[3] For further developments on this question of the “space
to be occupied”, see my answer to a debate between Alex Callinicos and François
Sabado at the foundation of the NPA-Godard, 2009. But the answer itself is
dated and shows what the experience of the NPA has brought along, despite its
failure: it remains well below a proper awareness. of the changes to be made in
our approach. See the following theses.
[4] To put it clearly, the FdG has seized the zeitgeist
better than the NPA, at least when it comes to elections. Mélenchon’s radical
speeches call for a “participatory” campaign, the use of such modes of
mobilisation as the occupation of public squares. Yet, and this will be a
problem for comrades who join the FdG, its ability to “capitalise” on its
voting base is still largely unproven. I tend to think there are too many
obstacles for this: the strength of the Communist Party, which will oppose a
“common house”, the focus on institutions, the tensions between the forces.
[5] See Sitel, 2008. For Francis Sitel, who knew the
organisation well, creating a new party with just the LCR as an organised force
was dangerous. Many of his arguments are interesting. The problem is that we do
not start from what we wish we had, but from what exists. On this basis, we must
find solutions. Otherwise we look for shortcuts. Francis Sitel left the NPA at
its very beginning, with the Gauche Unitaire, LCR activists who instead rallied
to the Front de Gauche. This grouping probably earned more positions by joining
the FdG early on. But its political evolution is such that the Gauche
Anticapitaliste often forgets to mention it among the currents that could form
an anti-capitalist pole within the FdG. Should this be a warning for the GA,
which broke away in June 2012?
[6] Adam and others, 2009.
[7] Johsua, 2006. Johsua notably concludes: “Outside a
revolutionary period, it is impossible to have a mass popular party (or
something approaching) without an institutional basis.”
[8] All the revolutionary processes of history are fascinating
to study from this point of view, from 1848 France to the 1974 revolution in
Portugal, the Russian Revolution of 1917 or the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Failures are more linked to the inability of the revolutionary process to have
parties up to the task than to lack of determination and radicality of the
movements. It is true that in the historical analysis it is easier to deduce
that the “masses” are lacking in this or that. This is a prime trick for
evading responsibilities. The other is to blame the “treacherous” leaders of
the class. Comfortable, certainly…but not very useful in strategic terms.
[9] See Marx, 1975, p251.
[10] About what is meant by political movement see Godard,
2011.
[11] NPA, 2011.
[12] Trotsky, 1938.
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