Endurance Games: Reassessing the mass strike based on recent experiences in France
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| Joint worker and student protest against the First Employment Contract in Rennes April 4 2006 |
Lisbeth Latham
Dwindling rates of industrial action - particularly in advanced capitalist countries- are often cited as evidence of the labour movement’s global decline. Yet the value of industrial action, and particularly mass strikes, are often grossly oversimplified. ‘If we strike, we will win’ may galvanise workers temporarily, but it belies the complex nature of social movements, where a willingness to struggle is only part of the formula necessary for victory. The complexity of this reality can be seen in the experiences of the contemporary French labour movement. In comparison to movements in other advanced capitalist countries, the French movement is often seen as incredibly militant and powerful. Yet, since the global financial crisis in 2008, it has suffered a series of defeats and has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise to the same extent as before. This is not to say that the French movement is any less heroic than it was in the past, but that the balance of class forces and the confidence of the French popular classes has declined. This has exposed limitations in the mass strike as an industrial tactic when it is not paired with a broader perspective of victory; winning requires not only mass involvement but also a determination to maintain struggle at times in the face of defeat.
The Mass Strike
One of the most influential works on strikes is The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions written by Rosa Luxemburg in 1906[1]. She sought to explore the experiences of Russia's failed 1905 revolution and draw lessons for the broader European social democratic movement. Prior to the pamphlet’s publication, social democracy had been highly critical of mass strikes, seeing them as an anarchist fantasy, as Luxemburg put it
The subsequent role of mass strike movements in creating legitimation crises for the capitalist class, blunting their offensive, and creating the impetus for revolutions has vindicated Luxemburg’s position[4]. At the same time mass strikes, like other tactics, have their limitations and even large mass strikes, as demonstrated by Russia in 1905, do not guarantee the successful achievement of a movement’s objectives.
The recent movements in France in defence of pensions and against labour market reforms are important experiences in demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses of the mass strike as a political tactic.
Leading into the global financial crisis the French working class had achieved a series of victories against government attacks. Most notably:
Dwindling rates of industrial action - particularly in advanced capitalist countries- are often cited as evidence of the labour movement’s global decline. Yet the value of industrial action, and particularly mass strikes, are often grossly oversimplified. ‘If we strike, we will win’ may galvanise workers temporarily, but it belies the complex nature of social movements, where a willingness to struggle is only part of the formula necessary for victory. The complexity of this reality can be seen in the experiences of the contemporary French labour movement. In comparison to movements in other advanced capitalist countries, the French movement is often seen as incredibly militant and powerful. Yet, since the global financial crisis in 2008, it has suffered a series of defeats and has found it increasingly difficult to mobilise to the same extent as before. This is not to say that the French movement is any less heroic than it was in the past, but that the balance of class forces and the confidence of the French popular classes has declined. This has exposed limitations in the mass strike as an industrial tactic when it is not paired with a broader perspective of victory; winning requires not only mass involvement but also a determination to maintain struggle at times in the face of defeat.
The Mass Strike
One of the most influential works on strikes is The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions written by Rosa Luxemburg in 1906[1]. She sought to explore the experiences of Russia's failed 1905 revolution and draw lessons for the broader European social democratic movement. Prior to the pamphlet’s publication, social democracy had been highly critical of mass strikes, seeing them as an anarchist fantasy, as Luxemburg put it
“the theory of the general strike as a means of inaugurating the social revolution, in contradistinction to the daily political struggle of the working-class – and exhausts itself in the following simple dilemma: either the proletariat as a whole are not yet in possession of the powerful organisation and financial resources required, in which case they cannot carry through the general strike; or they are already sufficiently well organised, in which case they do not need the general strike”[2]Contrary to this view Luxemburg argued:
“the mass strike in Russia has been realised not as means of evading the political struggle of the working-class, and especially of parliamentarism, not as a means of jumping suddenly into the social revolution by means of a theatrical coup, but as a means, firstly, of creating for the proletariat the conditions of the daily political struggle and especially of parliamentarism. The revolutionary struggle in Russia, in which mass strikes are the most important weapon, is, by the working people, and above all by the proletariat, conducted for those political rights and conditions whose necessity and importance in the struggle for the emancipation of the working-class”[3].
The subsequent role of mass strike movements in creating legitimation crises for the capitalist class, blunting their offensive, and creating the impetus for revolutions has vindicated Luxemburg’s position[4]. At the same time mass strikes, like other tactics, have their limitations and even large mass strikes, as demonstrated by Russia in 1905, do not guarantee the successful achievement of a movement’s objectives.
The recent movements in France in defence of pensions and against labour market reforms are important experiences in demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses of the mass strike as a political tactic.
Leading into the global financial crisis the French working class had achieved a series of victories against government attacks. Most notably:
- the strike wave against attacks on the public sector attacks in 1995
- the movement leading up to the defeat of the referendum on endorsing the Lisbon treaty in 2005; and
- the mass movement lead by students against the contrat première embauche (First Employment Contact - CPE) legislation in 2006[5]
At the same time the French organised left was in a process of breakdown and realignment. The Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) , once the hegemonic force on the French left saw its vote in presidential elections fall from 15.35% % in 1981 to 3.37% in 2002. As its old red-belt strongholds became locations of strength for the Front Nationale. deindustrialisation under successive Parti Socialiste (PS) -with the PCF as a minority partner- shattered France’s traditional heavy industrial areas[7]. The impact on the working class in these areas was devastating. Consequently, the PCF’s parliamentary representation became increasingly dependent on a non-aggression pact with the PS, who did not run candidates against sitting PCF MPs. This dependent relationship between the PCF and the PS was to become a key point of conflict in discussions regarding joint far-left candidates, with the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire (LCR) and subsequently the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste setting down a priori independence from the PS as a key basis for any discussions about united left electoral tickets[8].
It was not just the PCF who was negatively impacted; the PS suffered the indignity of running third in the 2002 presidential elections behind Jacques Chirac and Front Nationale’s (National Front - FN) Jean-Marie Le Pen[9]. Whilst some blamed this embarrassment on the shock results of the Trotskyist LCR (4.25%) and Lutte Ouvrière (5.72%) candidates, it still posed the question of why people weren’t voting for the PS. It also failed to explain why workers were voting for small far-left parties instead, or even abstaining from voting at all. This put the left in the position of having to respond to a presidential run-off between the right and the far-right - an unenviable position which was repeated in 2017 with the runoff between Macron and Marine Le Pen.
2009 Post GFC Movement
Triggered by the mass defaulting of subprime mortgages in the US economy and exacerbated by the failure of the mortgage backed securities which underwrote the loans, the GFC of 2007-2008 spread like an infection through the global financial sector. Yet as governments scrambled to bailout high finance, they also sought to shift the cost onto working people.[10]
In France this response was met with mass resistance. The intersyndicale (an informal alliance of union confederations at a national level) called for mass mobilisations against the policies of Sarkozy and the Fillon government. Their demands included: Increases in the minimum wage and payments to the unemployed and pensioners; Increased social spending on public housing; Action to reduce job losses including bans on redundancies at profitable companies; Reversal of the tax cuts given to the rich at the start of the crisis; Reversal of job losses and restructuring of the public sector[11]
The intersyndicale achieved a series of mass mobilisations throughout 2009, the largest of which was the general strike of March 19 which drew over 3 million people[12]. Despite these mobilisations the coalition was unable to force any real concessions from the government and, as they progressed, the mobilisations lost impetus.
This development was not a surprise to all the union leaderships. One of France’s most militant union confederations, the openly anti-capitalist Solidaires, consistently argued for a need to go beyond individual days of mobilisation. Solidaires predicted that, however successful, individual days of mobilisation alone would not be enough to steer the government from its well-worn course of protecting capital at the expense of working people. Instead, Solidaires argued for the need to build towards a renewable general strike[13]. As evidence of the effectiveness of this approach they pointed to the successful strikes by workers in the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe from January to March of that year. Although Solidaires leadership did concede under pressure from other unions that capacity for such action did not exist, they argued that the work still needed to be done. Affirming the movement’s need and capacity to mobilise on both a mass and ongoing basis would be more productive than simply acknowledging and accepting its inadequacies, they felt[14].
As 2009 continued the movement declined. By 13 June the once three million-strong movement had plummeted to a mere 150, 000 and was essentially over, having achieved very little in the way of concessions. At the same time, the state was preparing a new wave of attacks on working people, this time in the form of an assault on France’s pension system.
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| Joint mobilisation against the attack on France's Pension System 2010 |
2010 Pension Struggle
In early 2010, the Fillon government announced that it was seeking to change France’s pension system. The proposed changes included raising the retirement age and increasing workers’ contributions to the social security scheme - effectively requiring workers to work more hours over a greater duration of their lifetimes.
In the wake of this announcement, the Intersyndicale resumed meeting in earnest. Their concerns were well-founded. Though Fillon’s attack on the pension system threatened to disadvantage all workers, its impacts would be felt most acutely by women, significantly reducing the number of women expected to qualify for a full pension and exacerbating the problem of French women retiring into poverty.
From the outset, the unions were divided in their view of the objectives of the movement. The class-struggle unions (combat syndicales), whose membership includes Solidaires (Solidarity), Force Ouvrière (Workers Force - FO), and large sections of both the Federation Syndicale Unitaire (FSU) and Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) wanted the proposals to be totally withdrawn. The more conservative unions, most notably the Confédération française démocratique du travail (French Confederation of Democratic Workers - CFDT) and Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers - CFTC) were more conciliatory, seeking greater consultation with the government regarding the changes. Yet despite these differences, there was eventually a basis for a common united movement involving France’s eight main union confederations and federations - although the early movement involved just five[15].
Initially, the 2010 movement was far smaller than the previous years with the March protests reaching only 800, 000 nationally. These disappointing numbers inevitably gave rise to commentary that the defeat of 2009 had undermined the mobilising capacity of the movement. However, as the year progressed the movement began to grow and the pace of mobilisations increased. By 24 June mobilisations had reached 1.92 million. Numbers continued to grow as the legislation worked its way through France’s legislative processes in September and October. Ultimately, there were seven mobilisations, all exceeding two million people and peaking at 3.5 million. However, the total number of people involved in the movement is likely to have been far greater[16].
In early 2010, the Fillon government announced that it was seeking to change France’s pension system. The proposed changes included raising the retirement age and increasing workers’ contributions to the social security scheme - effectively requiring workers to work more hours over a greater duration of their lifetimes.
In the wake of this announcement, the Intersyndicale resumed meeting in earnest. Their concerns were well-founded. Though Fillon’s attack on the pension system threatened to disadvantage all workers, its impacts would be felt most acutely by women, significantly reducing the number of women expected to qualify for a full pension and exacerbating the problem of French women retiring into poverty.
From the outset, the unions were divided in their view of the objectives of the movement. The class-struggle unions (combat syndicales), whose membership includes Solidaires (Solidarity), Force Ouvrière (Workers Force - FO), and large sections of both the Federation Syndicale Unitaire (FSU) and Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) wanted the proposals to be totally withdrawn. The more conservative unions, most notably the Confédération française démocratique du travail (French Confederation of Democratic Workers - CFDT) and Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers - CFTC) were more conciliatory, seeking greater consultation with the government regarding the changes. Yet despite these differences, there was eventually a basis for a common united movement involving France’s eight main union confederations and federations - although the early movement involved just five[15].
Initially, the 2010 movement was far smaller than the previous years with the March protests reaching only 800, 000 nationally. These disappointing numbers inevitably gave rise to commentary that the defeat of 2009 had undermined the mobilising capacity of the movement. However, as the year progressed the movement began to grow and the pace of mobilisations increased. By 24 June mobilisations had reached 1.92 million. Numbers continued to grow as the legislation worked its way through France’s legislative processes in September and October. Ultimately, there were seven mobilisations, all exceeding two million people and peaking at 3.5 million. However, the total number of people involved in the movement is likely to have been far greater[16].
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| Solidaires Adverstisment calling for a genderal strike on September 9, 2010 |
Significantly, in a number of industries the days of mobilisation were linked by strike action. Initially these renewable strikes began in France’s oil refineries - triggered by a struggle around Total’s plans to close its Dunkirk refinery[17]. Yet the movement also spread to other sectors. This spread was facilitated, in part, by a decision within the intersyndicale to allow industrial action in workplaces, and at the municipal level, to be initiated by general assemblies of workers at those levels. This meant that, in those sectors and regions where the more militant unions had greater influence, they were able to link protracted strikes to the mobilisations, which were then called and supported by all unions between the punctuating mass mobilisations. Under France’s Labour Code and constitution, if one union in a workplace issues a strike notice then any worker can participate regardless of their union affiliation. While there were a number of spaces where renewable strikes were in effect, the most important of these was in the oil refineries whose closure massively disrupted fuel supplies across France[18].
Despite the size and escalating character of the movement the government pushed ahead with passing the legislation. In the wake of the passing of the legislation in November, there was one more joint mass mobilisation on November 23. The interior ministry estimated the protests size at 52, 000 and the unions did not announce a size estimate. This small mobilisation indicated that the movement had effectively collapsed. The more conservative unions withdrew from the campaign on the promise that the legislation, whose impact was not immediate but delayed, could be defeated via the election of a PS government in 2012.Those workers who remained on strike - most notably the oil refinery workers - became increasingly isolated as the movement collapsed. In Marseille, a city controlled by the PS, municipal workers were forced back to work using legislation introduced by the de Vilipin government the year before[19]. This legislation, which guaranteed minimum essential services during strikes, was anti-worker by design and undermined a number localised strikes that were holding out against the collapse of the broader movement
Movement against the First Employment Contract
In 2006, the de Villipin government had sought to introduce the CPE, a change in France’s employment laws which would have weakened the rights of workers under the age of 26, including allowing employers to dismiss young workers aged between 18-26 without notice or reason during their first two years of employment[20]. By targeting just younger workers, the de Villepin government hoped that by focusing on one section of the workforce they could divide and limit any potential opposition movement.
Initially this was the case, as there was limited united resistance by the union confederations[21]. However, despite the lack of leadership from workers’ unions, high school and university students, primarily organised via the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France (National Union of Students of France), Fédération indépendante et démocratique lycéenne (Independent and Democratic High School Federation), and the Union Nationale Lycéenne (National Union of Secondary Students) began their own mass mobilisations - shutting down schools and universities and driving mass mobilisations of students. These student mobilisations gave impetus for militants within the union confederations to push to support the student protests[22]. Between the rising peaks of mass mobilisations, student pursued a broader goal of disrupting the economy via their own collective actions and concentrated on building alliances with workers to support and exacerbate the disruption. By March 2006, 68 of France’s 89 universities were either occupied or on strike with many high schools across France barricaded shut by striking students[24]. More spectacular were the student occupations of rail lines or the successful blocking of Airbus airliners being transported from manufacturing plants[25].
As inspiring as the movement was, it was not significantly bigger or more disruptive than the 2010 movement. What really differentiated the 2006 movement against the CPE from the 2010 movement to defend pensions was that when the CPE was passed, the movement continued. In passing the legislation in 2006, the de Villepin government gambled that passing of the legislation would dissipate the movement and remove the threat to French state and capital[26]. When the movement continued despite the legislation passing the threat effectively expanded with no hope that it would decline in the short-term. In response to the movement’s determination, the government retreated and the legislation, despite passing, became a dead letter[27].
The lesson to be drawn from comparing the events of 2006 and 2010 is not that mass movements are no longer capable of winning, or that strikes are no longer crucial to achieving victory in industrial and political struggles. It is instead that these struggles are ultimately battles of will and endurance. What changed between 2006 and 2010 was not the capacity of the movement to mobilise- indeed the 2010 movement was arguably larger in size than the 2006 mobilisations. No, what differed between them was the determination of the ruling class to persist with their attacks on working people and, even more crucially, the ability in 2006 of the more radical sections of the movement, most notably the student unions, to cohere and mobilise after the passing of the legislation. It is not sufficient for our movements to be massive or powerful. In order to be victorious,the will and determination of workers must be strong enough to outlast that of capital and its governments. Escalating and disruptive action is thus most effective when deployed as a means of undermining capital’s confidence and endurance. The continuation of the mass movement of 2006 and consequent disruption of the economy cast the gamble made by the right to push forward with legislation as a grievous error, creating the fear that the movement would not stop. By contrast in 2010, the government’s bet proved correct, the movement did collapse and the state and capital could both be confident not only to maintain that round of attacks but contemplate and implant further attacks on working people.
Archive. https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1906/mass-strike/.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 Haug, F., Wilde, F., and Heidenreich, F. 2018. “Mass strike.” Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. https://www.rosalux.de/publikation/id/43671/mass-strike?cHash=4dc514bc263b77a899f91e9878b10683.
5 Cézard, Yann. 2020. “1995-2003-2010: lessons from three large-scale mobilizations.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article6347.
Carasso, L. 2005. “E After the success of the "no from the left."” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article845.
Carasso, L. 2006. “A major social and solitical crisis.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1070.
6 Amable, B. and Palombarini, S. 2021. The last neoliberal: Macron and the origins of France's political crisis. London: Verso.
7 Jacobin. 2016. “When the workers were communists.” Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/10/when-the-workers-were-communists/.
8 Perez, Benito. 2007. “The presidential campaign is rotting French political life.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1214.
Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire. 2007. “For the foundation of a new anti-capitalist party.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1290.
Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire. 2008. “Address for a new anticapitalist party.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1422.
9 Henley, J. 2002. “French poll result seen as catastrophe.” DAWN. https://www.dawn.com/news/29700/french-poll-result-seen-as-catastrophe.
10 Mirowski, P. 2014. Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. London: Verso.
11 Latham, L. 2009a. “French unions ready for a general strike on March 19.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/03/french-unions-ready-for-general-strike.html.
12 Latham, L. 2009b. “French unions plan campaign against financial crisis Following 3 Million strong general strike.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/03/french-union-plan-campaign-following-3.html.
13 National Burea of the Trade Union Solidaires. 2009. “Together let us make the assessment - To be stronger tomorrow.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/09/solidaires-assessment-of-french.html.
14 ibid.
15 Latham, L. 2010a. “Thousands of French workers march to defend pensions.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/03/thousands-of-french-workers-march-to.html.
16 ibid
Latham, L. 2010b. “French workers mobilise to defend pensions.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/06/french-workers-mobilise-to-defend.html.
Latham, L. 2010c. “Millions of workers march to defend pensions in France.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/09/millions-of-workers-march-to-defend.html.
Latham, L. 2010d. “French workers fight back against pension attack.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/french-workers-fight-back-against.html.
Trade Union Solidaires. 2010. “Solidaires - Pensions: Win by our determination!” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/solidaires-pensions-win-by-our.html.
17 Latham, L. 2010e. “French Senate votes to raise retirement age as unions prepare for a day of strikes.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/french-senate-votes-to-raise-retirement.html.
18 Andrews, W. and Vandoorne, S. 2010. “Fuel imports into France surge as protests imperil transportation.” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/18/france.strikes.shortage/index.html.
19 Latham, L. 2010f. “France: Sarkozy enacts pensions law as mass mobilisations continue.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/11/france-sarkozy-enacts-pensions-law-as.html.
Smith, M. 2010. “France: Not victorious, but not defeated.” Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal. http://links.org.au/node/2034.
20 Steven. 2006. “The French movement against the CPE, 2006.” libcom. https://libcom.org/blog/short-history-cpe-protests-france.
21 Cézard op cit.
22 Cézard op cit.
Steven op cit
Périn, M. 2006. “Inside the occupation movement: ‘Together we are recreating our university.’” Socialist Worker, March 18, 2006. https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/8300/Inside+the+occupation+movement%3A+Together+we+are+recreating+our+university.
23 Smith, M. 2006a. “Student movement puts government on the defensive.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article996.
Wolfreys, J. 2006. “Daniel Bensaïd: ‘This movement is directly based on a social question.’” Socialist Worker. https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/8364/Daniel+Bensa%C3%AFd%3A+This+movement+is+directly+based+on+a+social+question.
24 Duthu, M. 2006. “French workers and youth unite against the First Employment Contract: No to all precarious contracts.” In Defence of Marxism. https://www.marxist.com/french-workers-youth-unite160306.htm.
Smith, M. 2006b. “Anti-labour law movement enters key stage.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1000.
25 Chrisafis, A. 2006. “Chirac backs down and scraps youth job law.” The Guardian, April 11, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/11/france.angeliquechrisafis.
26 ibid.
Cézard op cit.
Steven op cit.
27 Cézard op cit.
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Despite the size and escalating character of the movement the government pushed ahead with passing the legislation. In the wake of the passing of the legislation in November, there was one more joint mass mobilisation on November 23. The interior ministry estimated the protests size at 52, 000 and the unions did not announce a size estimate. This small mobilisation indicated that the movement had effectively collapsed. The more conservative unions withdrew from the campaign on the promise that the legislation, whose impact was not immediate but delayed, could be defeated via the election of a PS government in 2012.Those workers who remained on strike - most notably the oil refinery workers - became increasingly isolated as the movement collapsed. In Marseille, a city controlled by the PS, municipal workers were forced back to work using legislation introduced by the de Vilipin government the year before[19]. This legislation, which guaranteed minimum essential services during strikes, was anti-worker by design and undermined a number localised strikes that were holding out against the collapse of the broader movement
 |
| Mobilisation in Marseille March 18, 2006 |
Movement against the First Employment Contract
In 2006, the de Villipin government had sought to introduce the CPE, a change in France’s employment laws which would have weakened the rights of workers under the age of 26, including allowing employers to dismiss young workers aged between 18-26 without notice or reason during their first two years of employment[20]. By targeting just younger workers, the de Villepin government hoped that by focusing on one section of the workforce they could divide and limit any potential opposition movement.
Initially this was the case, as there was limited united resistance by the union confederations[21]. However, despite the lack of leadership from workers’ unions, high school and university students, primarily organised via the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France (National Union of Students of France), Fédération indépendante et démocratique lycéenne (Independent and Democratic High School Federation), and the Union Nationale Lycéenne (National Union of Secondary Students) began their own mass mobilisations - shutting down schools and universities and driving mass mobilisations of students. These student mobilisations gave impetus for militants within the union confederations to push to support the student protests[22]. Between the rising peaks of mass mobilisations, student pursued a broader goal of disrupting the economy via their own collective actions and concentrated on building alliances with workers to support and exacerbate the disruption. By March 2006, 68 of France’s 89 universities were either occupied or on strike with many high schools across France barricaded shut by striking students[24]. More spectacular were the student occupations of rail lines or the successful blocking of Airbus airliners being transported from manufacturing plants[25].
As inspiring as the movement was, it was not significantly bigger or more disruptive than the 2010 movement. What really differentiated the 2006 movement against the CPE from the 2010 movement to defend pensions was that when the CPE was passed, the movement continued. In passing the legislation in 2006, the de Villepin government gambled that passing of the legislation would dissipate the movement and remove the threat to French state and capital[26]. When the movement continued despite the legislation passing the threat effectively expanded with no hope that it would decline in the short-term. In response to the movement’s determination, the government retreated and the legislation, despite passing, became a dead letter[27].
The lesson to be drawn from comparing the events of 2006 and 2010 is not that mass movements are no longer capable of winning, or that strikes are no longer crucial to achieving victory in industrial and political struggles. It is instead that these struggles are ultimately battles of will and endurance. What changed between 2006 and 2010 was not the capacity of the movement to mobilise- indeed the 2010 movement was arguably larger in size than the 2006 mobilisations. No, what differed between them was the determination of the ruling class to persist with their attacks on working people and, even more crucially, the ability in 2006 of the more radical sections of the movement, most notably the student unions, to cohere and mobilise after the passing of the legislation. It is not sufficient for our movements to be massive or powerful. In order to be victorious,the will and determination of workers must be strong enough to outlast that of capital and its governments. Escalating and disruptive action is thus most effective when deployed as a means of undermining capital’s confidence and endurance. The continuation of the mass movement of 2006 and consequent disruption of the economy cast the gamble made by the right to push forward with legislation as a grievous error, creating the fear that the movement would not stop. By contrast in 2010, the government’s bet proved correct, the movement did collapse and the state and capital could both be confident not only to maintain that round of attacks but contemplate and implant further attacks on working people.
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1 Luxemburg, R. 1906. The mass strike, the political party, and the trade unions. Marxist Internet Archive. https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1906/mass-strike/.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 Haug, F., Wilde, F., and Heidenreich, F. 2018. “Mass strike.” Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. https://www.rosalux.de/publikation/id/43671/mass-strike?cHash=4dc514bc263b77a899f91e9878b10683.
5 Cézard, Yann. 2020. “1995-2003-2010: lessons from three large-scale mobilizations.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article6347.
Carasso, L. 2005. “E After the success of the "no from the left."” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article845.
Carasso, L. 2006. “A major social and solitical crisis.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1070.
6 Amable, B. and Palombarini, S. 2021. The last neoliberal: Macron and the origins of France's political crisis. London: Verso.
7 Jacobin. 2016. “When the workers were communists.” Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/10/when-the-workers-were-communists/.
8 Perez, Benito. 2007. “The presidential campaign is rotting French political life.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1214.
Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire. 2007. “For the foundation of a new anti-capitalist party.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1290.
Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire. 2008. “Address for a new anticapitalist party.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1422.
9 Henley, J. 2002. “French poll result seen as catastrophe.” DAWN. https://www.dawn.com/news/29700/french-poll-result-seen-as-catastrophe.
10 Mirowski, P. 2014. Never let a serious crisis go to waste: How neoliberalism survived the financial meltdown. London: Verso.
11 Latham, L. 2009a. “French unions ready for a general strike on March 19.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/03/french-unions-ready-for-general-strike.html.
12 Latham, L. 2009b. “French unions plan campaign against financial crisis Following 3 Million strong general strike.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/03/french-union-plan-campaign-following-3.html.
13 National Burea of the Trade Union Solidaires. 2009. “Together let us make the assessment - To be stronger tomorrow.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2009/09/solidaires-assessment-of-french.html.
14 ibid.
15 Latham, L. 2010a. “Thousands of French workers march to defend pensions.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/03/thousands-of-french-workers-march-to.html.
16 ibid
Latham, L. 2010b. “French workers mobilise to defend pensions.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/06/french-workers-mobilise-to-defend.html.
Latham, L. 2010c. “Millions of workers march to defend pensions in France.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/09/millions-of-workers-march-to-defend.html.
Latham, L. 2010d. “French workers fight back against pension attack.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/french-workers-fight-back-against.html.
Trade Union Solidaires. 2010. “Solidaires - Pensions: Win by our determination!” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/solidaires-pensions-win-by-our.html.
17 Latham, L. 2010e. “French Senate votes to raise retirement age as unions prepare for a day of strikes.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/10/french-senate-votes-to-raise-retirement.html.
18 Andrews, W. and Vandoorne, S. 2010. “Fuel imports into France surge as protests imperil transportation.” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/18/france.strikes.shortage/index.html.
19 Latham, L. 2010f. “France: Sarkozy enacts pensions law as mass mobilisations continue.” Revitalising Labour. https://revitalisinglabour.blogspot.com/2010/11/france-sarkozy-enacts-pensions-law-as.html.
Smith, M. 2010. “France: Not victorious, but not defeated.” Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal. http://links.org.au/node/2034.
20 Steven. 2006. “The French movement against the CPE, 2006.” libcom. https://libcom.org/blog/short-history-cpe-protests-france.
21 Cézard op cit.
22 Cézard op cit.
Steven op cit
Périn, M. 2006. “Inside the occupation movement: ‘Together we are recreating our university.’” Socialist Worker, March 18, 2006. https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/8300/Inside+the+occupation+movement%3A+Together+we+are+recreating+our+university.
23 Smith, M. 2006a. “Student movement puts government on the defensive.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article996.
Wolfreys, J. 2006. “Daniel Bensaïd: ‘This movement is directly based on a social question.’” Socialist Worker. https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/8364/Daniel+Bensa%C3%AFd%3A+This+movement+is+directly+based+on+a+social+question.
24 Duthu, M. 2006. “French workers and youth unite against the First Employment Contract: No to all precarious contracts.” In Defence of Marxism. https://www.marxist.com/french-workers-youth-unite160306.htm.
Smith, M. 2006b. “Anti-labour law movement enters key stage.” International Viewpoint. https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1000.
25 Chrisafis, A. 2006. “Chirac backs down and scraps youth job law.” The Guardian, April 11, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/11/france.angeliquechrisafis.
26 ibid.
Cézard op cit.
Steven op cit.
27 Cézard op cit.
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